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There are three things in life you cannot hide
love, smoke, and a man riding on a camel.
. . . Old Arab Proverb
..
PREFACE
In our time, history has recorded a great surge of nationalism
throughout the world. Many changes have taken place in the physical
boundaries of long-established countries, and still greater change is
evidenced by the rise of new political entities which have considera-
bly altered the geography of the world.
Many former colonial possessions of European powers, the harvest
of an imperialistic nineteenth century, have been stirred by the
nationalistic fever and have emerged, through evolution and revolution,
into definite nationality.
The roll call of new nations since World War II alone has been
tremendous, and within the next twenty-five years the list will be
nearly doubled.
With the coming of independence to these former colonial pos-
sessions, many of which are categorized as "underdeveloped," an entire
new series of problems are presented. As King Idris of Libya remarked
after his infant nation gained its political freedom, "It is an
achievement to gain independence, but it is a still greater one to
maintain it."
It is the author's purpose in this thesis, to present and analyze
some of the public relations problems facing the governments of new
and future nations. Those presented are by no means the extent of
their problems, however, in the author's opinion, they do represent
five areas where the greater difficulty can be anticipated.
v
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Some of these problems will seem relatively simple, but it must
be remembered that many of the new nations have not enjoyed the edu-
cational or political freedoms that we have come to take for granted.
Bearing this in mind, the simple problems to be discussed take on new
importance
.
For his presentation, the author has selected Libya as the model
for discussion. In some cases, the conclusions drawn are not as soe-
cific as might be desired. This is due in oart to the fact that the
subject nation has yet to solve particular problems, however, the fact
that the Libyan government has been made AWARE that these problems
do exist is indicative that a solution is in the offing.
The author, who has spent over two years in Libya as a member of
our Foreign Service, feels that the public relations problems which
faced Libya on its independence day are by no means unique to that
nation alone. The five areas to be discussed in this thesis will
present major problems for any nation emerging to independence in the
future.
Drawing mainly on his personal experiences in Libya, the author
has had to reconcile himself to one major barrier. As a former
Foreign Service officer, he no longer enjoys access to Federal classi-
fied documents. Even though his knowledge of certain documents would
greatly enhance the •'writing of this thesis, he is forbidden by law
to discuss or reproduce any material of a classified nature.
The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of personal
friends, both in Libya and in Washington, D. C., without whose as-
sistance this thesis might never have been written. The author’s
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research was greatly aided through the efforts of William G. Murphy,
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INTRODUCTION
On December 2h 9 1951, a new nation was born.
Libya, a vast expanse of mountain and sand, situated on the southern
shore of the Mediterranean Sea, emerged to definite nationality after 2600
years of foreign domination.
Known to historians as the one-time center of Graeco-Roman culture in
Africa, Libya achieved its independence in a manner unique in the annals
of history in that it was literally thrust upon her by external forces—
namely, the United Nations.
Since that eventful day in 1951, Libya’s growing pains have been
severe. A land devoid of natural resources, a land where there is but
two flawing streams in the entire country (the larger being less than a
half-mile long), the new nation is a far cry'" from the Libya described by
H omer
:
That happly clime, where each revolving year
The teeming ewes a triple offspring bear;
And two fair crescents of translucent horn
The brows of their young increase adorn;
The shepherds swains, with sure abundance blest,
On flat rock and rural dainties feast;
Nor want of herbage makes the dairy fail.
But everyr season fills the foaming pail.
Under the leadership of Emir (Prince) Idris el-Senussi, temporal
and spiritual leader of Cyrenaica, the eastern province, Libya won its
long and. arduous struggle for independence. In 19h9, six years after
the end of the war in North Africa, the United Nations decreed that
Libya would not revert to her pre-war masters, the Italians. Instead,
( 1 )
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Xit was decided that Libya would become a free and independent state no
later than January 1, 1952.
Through the wise and efficient counsel of Adrian Pelt of the
Netherlands, the United Nations Commissioner for Libya, and a constitu-
ent assembly of twenty-one members selected from the three provinces,
it was decided that the new nation would enjoy a constitutional monarchy
as its form of government, and Emir Idris el-Senussi was selected by the
Libyan people to become its first king.
Thus, the first god-child of the United Nations was born.
-x * *
For the purpose of this thesis, public relations is defined as a
planned program of policies and conduct that will build public confidence
and increase public understanding of the projects introduced by their
government. The public relations problems facing the infant Libyan
government at its independence were legion. They arose from and were
propagated by national problems of staggering proportion. Libya’s
national economy was perhaps the poorest in the world with a per capita
income of less than $35 per year. The existing educational system was
pitifully inadequate in meeting the needs of the people. The national
health standards of the country were terribly deficient, and the nation-
al treasury was virtually non-existent.
The biggest problem of all seemed to be "where to begin," but
through the guiding hand of the United Nations, the conscientious
desire for freedom of the Libyan people, and the understanding coopera-
tion of friendly nations, notably the United States and Great Britain,
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Libya began to n pull herself up by the bootstraps."
An analysis of the many public relations problems facing the new
government would be a monumental task. The author has, therefore
,
selected five areas in which the greater difficulty occurred and was
systematically attacked by the government. The five chosen represent
the areas in which the greater deficiency existed, a choice substanti-
ated by the Libyan governmental budget. And it should be understood
that before a new nation can stand on its own feet, a solution for, or
at least an awareness of these problems is prerequisite.
The areas to be covered in this thesis and in their order of im-
portance are:
1. Nationalism, from the internal point of view . The author will
attempt to show that one of the earliest public relations problems fac-
ing the new government literally entailed the building of national pride.
This effort was accomplished in face of strong tribal and provincial
opposition, an accomplishment necessary for the initiation of policies
and projects in the national interest.
2. Communications , This chapter will present the public relations
problems which accompanied the communication development in the new
nation. In general, the author will look at communications in the con-
text of roads, airports, radio and telecommunications. One particular
problem. Radio Tripoli, the first national radio transmitter, has been
singled out for detailed observation because of its interdependence with
other national public relations problems.
3. Education . The public relations problems which accompanied
this national issue were not as difficult as those in other areas. The
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desire for education by the Libyan people, a desire unsatisfied under
their former Fascist masters, was so acute that the government had little
to do other than to encourage it. Problems did arise from the external
point of view, i.e., in convincing friendly powers and the United Nations
that the national educational needs were so poignant as to require con-
siderable external financial assistance to alleviate the problem.
National Economy . The new government found itself in dire
need of external financing almost from birth. At one time, the govern-
ments of the United States and Great Britain virtually underwrote the
entire national budget. The efforts of the Libyan government to make
its nation self-sufficient are praiseworthy. Of the many public relations
problems occurring in this area, some have yet to be solved. By virtue
of the scope of this area, only the highlights will be discussed in this
chapter
.
3>. National Health . The public relations problems existing in
this area during the early days of Libyan independence represent some
of the most difficult problems discussed in this thesis. They involved,
in some cases, the introduction of some regional groups to the twentieth
century. Regional superstition and tribal custom were the two major
barriers facing the novice government. This opposition caused consider-
able difficulty and expense to government leaders. A solution for these
problems could not be legislated, and the leaders wisely circumvented
the problems through the medium of education. As such, the problem
still exists today, though in a daily diminishing degree.
In retrospect, the public relations problems which faced the
Libyan government at its independence, seem greater today than they did
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in those early days. Proceeding virtually on blind faith, the Libyan
government has leaped these seemingly insurmountable barriers with typi-
cal Arab patience.
Having no organized public relations program per se, the measures
adopted by the new government in carrying out the public relations func-
tion constituted an acute awareness of social need and national welfare
rather than a PR program as we know it. To us, public relations is a
product of education and sophistication, but for a nation emerging to
independence for the first time in history, it can mean something else.
The author does not doubt for one minute that few Libyans could
define public relations at the time of their independence, however, the
practices and policies initiated by the new government utilized many
public relations principles and procedures. It is these principles and
procedures that the author will present and analyze in the forthcoming
chapters.
The public relations problems facing the new government might be
paraphrased as follows: How does the government of any new nation in-
still in its citizenry the desire for and understanding of governmental
projects and policies which are in the national interest?
Bearing this question in mind, the author will show that the
measures adopted by the novice government utilizing the limited media
at their disposal, were and are proving successful.
It is also the rather ambitious desire of the author that Libya’s
example will prove valuable to governments of future nations emerging
to independence in Africa and elsewhere in the world.
* * -*
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CHAPTER I
The first and one of the most important problems facing the govern-
ment of a new nation concerns that of nationalism from the internal point
of view. In the interest of clarity, the problem may be simply stated:
"How does a nation instill in its citizenry the ONENESS, or patriotic
pride of being, in the case presented here, Libyans."
This problem encompasses the importance of nationalism over provin-
cial, local and tribal considerations. It operates on the premise that
before a nation can pull together, it must possess a singleness of purpose,
and patriotism most readily lends itself to this cause.
In Libya, the novice government was aware that such a problem ex-
isted long before actual independence came about. But before we can
discuss the measures adopted to curb provincialism and tribal influence,
we must first look back into history to seek the sources of the influences.
With the crumbling of the old Ottoman Empire in the last quarter
of the Nineteenth Century, Libya, like other North African Turkish pos-
sessions, became ripe for conquest. Imperial istic-minded European
powers saw Africa as a theater of expansion. France became interested
in Morocco. England gained Egypt as a protectorate, and occupied the
islands of Malta and Cyprus. As far back as i860, Italy had designs on
Tunisia, but France upset Italian calculations by occupying Tunis in
1881, and Italy was forced to look elsewhere in North Africa for its
colonial expansion.
By rationalizing that Libya had once been a province of the old
Roman Empire, and, having received a lesson in diplomacy at the hands
..
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2of the French, Italy took great care to preceed actual occupation of the
last Turkish colony in North Africa by skillful diplomatic maneuvering. ;
Having received the blessings of England and France for her recogni-
tion of their occupation of Egypt and Morocco, Italy then sought the aid
of Russia. In 1909? Russia’s consent to Italian designs in Libya was ob-
tained in exchange for a similar consent regarding Russian ambitions in
the Dardanelles. Italy's diplomatic groundwork for aggressive penetra-
tion of Libya was thus completed.
For the next two years, Italy proceeded at an accelerated pace with
peaceful penetration of the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
Great sums of Italian money flowed into the two provinces in the form of
foreign investments and loans to the ruling Beys. By 1911? Italian
Government schools, which had been in existence in Libya for many years,
boasted an enrollment of over 1700 students.
In September, 1911? Italian Premier Giolitti, using many trumped-up
charges, dispatched an ultimatum to the Turkish government, and, without
waiting for a reply, ordered the invasion of Tripolitania. ( 3 ) The
Italian war machine was on the march.
The Italo-Turkish War lasted for one year, and in 1912 was ended by
the Treaty of Ouchy. This treaty gave Italy the provinces of Tripolitania
and Cyrenaica in Libya, as well as the Dodecanese Islands. Ratification
of these acquisitions did not take place until the Treaty of Lausanne,
in 1923.
( 2 )
'Roland R. DeMarco, The Italianization of African Natives , (New
York, N. Y. : Bureau of Publications, Columbia University, 19^3 ) ? p. xv.
(3)
Aref ben Musa, "Libya: Yesterday and Today" (unpublished research
paper, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 1953)? p. 2k •
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3With the coming of the Italians to Libya, we have the basis for
provincial and tribal thinking at the expense of national consideration.
And yet, this is not absolutely true. It is true that Arab resistance
to the Italians \vas great in Tripolitania, but it was small in compari-
son to the resistance in Cyrenaica. History records that Italian con-
solidation of Tripolitania came about in 1923—twelve years after the
first invasion of that province. In Cyrenaica, however, the entire pro-
vince resisted until 1932, nearly thirty years after the first Italian
soldier stepped ashore in Libya.
The statement that the Italians were the source of tribal and pro-
vincial thinking is true if placed in the proper context. To the resis-
tance leaders of Cyrenaica, their brothers to the West in Tripolitania,
"sold out" to the invaders at the price of peace. This being the case,
and in some instances the charge was justified, Cyrenaicans, who by
nature are a close, tribal-centered people, relegated their western
brothers to an inferior position among the Libyan Arabs.
The statement is not true when you consider that there never was
a nationalistic feeling among the Libyans per se. Classical definition
supports this premise since there was no Libyan nation at that time,
nor had there ever been in the 2800 years preceeding it.
In the interest of proper context, it is also necessary to under-
stand that Tripolitania was more urbanly oriented than was Cyrenaica.
Since the Italian domination was centered primarily on controlling the
towns, and having military superiority over the ill-trained and poorly
equipped Arab soldiers, it is understandable that Tripolitania capitu-
lated to the Italian invaders. Indeed, it is amazing that their re-
sistance lasted as long as it did.
.¥
hNevertheless, the surrender of Tripolitania to the Italians can be
accepted as the basis for the inferior feeling that Cyrenaicans hold
for their western brothers.
Utilizing the old axiom, "divide et impera," the Italians were
quick to exploit religious differences between the followers of the
Sunna, or Sunnite school of Islam, and the Abadite school followed by
the Berbers.
'
J/
' The latter constituted a large minority in western
Tripolitania.
The invaders furthered their plan of divide and conquer by offer-
ing the Tripolitanian leaders lucrative concessions for establishing
internal autonomy in the province and the election of a parliament.
With the acceptance of these concessions, the provincial leaders soon
discovered the subtlety of the Italian purpose. The legal documents
which they signed prevented their taking action even after learning
that the Italian plan was responsible for the disintegration of the
forces of the Tripolitanian insurgents. Thus by guile and a superior
array, the Italians consolidated the province under a new flag.
DEMOGRAPHIC RESETTLEMENT :
The principle motive for Italian interest in Libya concerned the
problem of Italy’s growing population. The country was literally
"bursting at the seams" with a rapidly increasing citizenry. Because
of this, and an acute economic condition which existed at the time,
high-level authorities in the Italian government saw colonial expansion
as a possible solution for their problems. It is interesting to note
(ii)
Ibid
., p. 29.
( 5 )Ibid., p. 30
..
.
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5that a similar motive prompted Japanese expansion into Manchuria at a
later date.
After the original consolidation of Tripolitania, emigration to
Libya was on a more or less haphazard basis. Poor Sicilian farmers
came to Libya in the hope of a better life. Later, with the rise of
the Fascist regime of Benito Mussolini, an organized plan for the emi-
gration of Italian peasants to Libya was bom. This plan, known as
"demographic resettlement," was the result of careful and elaborate
planning, (6) With the precision of a military invasion, the plan, in-
stituted in 1938, saw eleven thousand Italian families transported
into Italy’s new "fourth shore."
Sailing from the ports on Genoa and Naples, one convoy was re-
viewed at sea by none other than II Duce himself. The clock-like
precision of the mass exodus was the effort of the then Governor Gen-
eral of Libya, General Italo Balbo,
Prior to the first convoy’s sailing, great planning was needed.
Each family arriving in Libya had land cleared for them. A house, barn,
a cow or two, fodder, furniture, tools and a six-months supply of food
was waiting for each new occupant. Entire rural villages were construct-
ed near the resettlement areas. Each contained a church (with an accompany-
ing priest,) stores, coffee shops, medical clinic and Fascist headquarters.
The scheme not only resettled people, but brought their old customs and
traditions with them.
^Martin Moore, Fourth Shore, (London: George Routledge & Sons,
Ltd., 19U0), p. 72.
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6Each family selected for resettlement in Libya was required to
meet specific standards. Genuine peasant stock was mandatory for all
applicants, since desert farming is no task for unemployed artisans
or clerks, however adventurous. The scheme also forbade the use of
hired labor, so the families selected had to be sufficiently numerous
to work its farm unaided, with at least five members being of age and
( 7 )health to warrant their doing farm labor.'
Another incentive to the plan was the assurance that the Italian
government would take care of the emigrants until such time as their
desert farmland would produce a crop.
While the scheme literally reconstructed the Libyan topography,
the Fascist propagandist conveniently overlooked one important item.
The land for this scheme had been confiscated from the Libyan people.
It was simply a matter of "to the victor belongs the spoils.”
By way of restitution, and as a means to pacify the Libyan in-
surgents, the scheme also called for, and actually completed several
resettlement areas and villages for the displaced Arab. With one ex-
ception, the building of a Mosque instead of a church, identical
villages were constructed for the Tripolitanian Arab, Each had a
school in which Italian was mandatory for all Arab children, but for
the most part, all an Arab child could hope for was a fourth grade
education. This was felt ample for people who were to be relegated
to the status of "second class” citizens.
(7) Ibid., p. 20
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7With the growth of urban life in Libya resulting from the demo-
graphic resettlement scheme, a new sophistication arose among the town
dwellers. Imitating their Italian masters, many Tripolitanians came
to "look down" on their Cyrenaican brothers as uneducated and backward
country cousins. This feeling only added fuel to the fire of intense
provincialism, a fire which was to bum brightly until the nation re-
ceived its independence in 1951.
Paradoxically, many Libyan national heroes and martyrs, men such
as the famed 72 year-old Omar Muktar, who led the resistance in
Cyrenaica until his capture and subsequent hanging,^ were hailed as
patriots by Tripolitanians as well as Cyrenaicans. This was due in
part to the rise of the Fascist regime in Italy which repudiated all
previous political concessions granted to the Libyans.
*
-a- #
WORLD M II: AN AID TO LIBYAN INDEPENDENCE
With the coming of the Second World War to Libya, the cause of
Libyan nationalism was again advanced. Since the capitulation of
Cyrenaica to the invaders in 1932, many patriotic Libyans retreated
across the border to Egypt, from whence they waged continuous guerrilla
warfare against the enemy. Fighting against overwhelming odds and
against a foe equipped with tanks and aircraft, the Libyan marauders
became a constant thorn in the side of the Italian colonists.
ZO\
;Major General D.
British Military Press,
C. Cumming, Handbook on Cyrenaica,
19li3), p. ii9.
(Cairo:
(9)ben Musa, Op. cit., p. 30
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8At the outbreak of the global war, these sturdy Libyan warriors
volunteered their services to the British Eighth Army in Egypt. Used
primarily as scouts and for long-range desert reconnaisance, the
Libyan units soon found themselves opposing their Libyan brothers who
had been conscripted into the Italian Army. Following a series of
Italian defeats at the hands of the British, the Libyan divisions sur-
rendered en masse, and through the efforts of Idris el-Senussi, who
had been in forced exile in Alexandria, these men were formed into a
small army and were welcomed by the British. Under the personal
leadership of Idris, this small force took part in many battles for
Libyan soil. Thus Libya had a national army before it had a nation.
With the liberation of Benghazi, the Cyrenaican capital, British
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, speaking before the House of Commons,
pledged that once the war was over, Cyrenaica would never again be
under the yoke of Italian domination. This pledge, made in apprecia-
tion for the valuable assistance given to the British Eighth Army by
Emir Idris and his small army from 19UO-U3., became the first external
justification for a free and sovereign Libyan state.
In the years following the war, the United Nations received sever-
al plans for the disposition of the former Italian colonial possessions.
One such plan, known as the Bevan-Sforza Plan, was an Anglo-Italian
agreement of trusteeship. This plan would have had Tripolitania given
as a trustee to Italy, Cyrenaica to the British, and the Fezzan to the
French. The latter nation had staked a claim in the Fezzan by virtue
of its liberation during the war in General LeClerc's now-famous forced
march from the Lake Chad region of French Equatorial Africa to join with
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9the British Eighth Army before Tripoli. This plan and the subsequent
demonstrations against it in Libya, swayed public opinion in the world
organization to the extent that it was abandoned.
In I9I46, at a Paris meeting of the United Nations, Russia asked
to be given Tripolitania as well as Eritrea as war reparations from an
enemy it had never fought. The Western powers, realizing that this
would give the Soviets a foothold in both the Mediterranean and Red
Seas, quickly vetoed the suggestion.
The final plan, that of November 21, 19149, was adopted. An his-
torical resolution of the United Nations provided that Libya, composed
of three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, would be
constituted as an independent and sovereign state, no later than
January 1, 1952.
As Idris I, Emir of Cyrenaica, accepted the throne as the first
King of Libya, he was aware that many of his people, having never en-
joyed their own government, were extremely tribal and provincial-
minded, Anticipating difficulties from this quarter, the new monarch
wisely selected his ministers and officials from the other two provinces
as well as from his native Cyrenaica. This measure brought about a cer-
tain amount of criticism from Cyrenaicans, who felt that since they alone
had fought the cause of Libyan freedom, they should be the ones to govern
it exclusively. But as the new leader was the stritual as well as tempo-
ral ruler of the country, these objections were quickly put aside.
For many Tripolitanians
,
the new king was a Cyrenaican first and a
Libyan second. This feeling was unfortunate, as the wise monarch never
thought of himself in that manner, and had for years dreamed of a free
and unified Lib3a
.
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In an effort to pacify all of his subjects, the King established
two capitals for his new country, one in Tripoli and the other in
Benghazi. The government alternates between the two capitals every
four years.
One of the measures adopted by the new government which resulted
in increased national pride for the infant nation, was Libya's joining
of the Arab League. The nation members of this organization have many
common interests—religion, language and general culture. From the
prestige point of view alone, this move went far in helping the citi-
zens of the new nation to think of themselves as Libyans and not merely
as members of the Baraka tribe or as a Fezzani.
Italian-named streets were renamed in honor of Libyan heroes.
Nearly every town in the country has a Sharia (street) Omar Muktar, or
a Sharia Istiklal (independence.)
The establishment of a postal system and a monetary system in-
stilled a further pride in the Libyan citizenry. The image of King
Idris, their beloved leader, adorned the first stamps and monetary
notes. Since that time, however, the King has requested that his name
and picture be stripped from all stamps and. currency, as well as from
many government installations. This humble monarch holds that such
prestige should be reserved for God.
In a further move which endeared him to his people, Idris revoked
all titles and special privileges of the Royal family, to show his
struggling people that there would be no favorites in his administra-
tion. He also publicly announced his desire that every Libyan should
,.
,
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be in a position to inform his King of his troubles or complaints. To
facilitate ibis desire, Idris ordered that all letters addressed to him
should need no stamps, and ordered special mail boxes be placed outside
the gates of his palaces into which his people can drop their letters
addressed to him.
THE BATTLE IS NOT YET WON
Tribal and provincial feeling still maintains an important place
in the everyday opinions and attitudes of many Libyans. It is, however,
decreasing almost daily.
For example, in the fall of 19^6, following the assignment of
specific oil exploration sites to American, British and French oil com-
panies, an American geologist was working in a Wadi (dry river bed) in
central Cyrenaica. Looking up from his work, he found himself surround-
ed by a group of Cyrenaican tribesmen, many of whom were armed with
rifles. Through an interpreter, the geologist invited the men to tea,
as is the custom in that part of the world. After discussing pleasant-
ries for awhile, the old Sheik then asked the American what he was
doing in that particular Wadi. The geologist replied that he was doing
preliminary work in the search for dl, and that his company’s search
was under the auspices of the Libyan King and the Petroleum Commission.
To this, the old Sheik replied that these lands belonged to his tribe,
that they had always belonged to his tribe, and that the government of
Libya nor the King himself had any jurisdiction over them. He added
that the only person who could give the needed permission to look for
^^R. P. E. Hefter, ”H. M. King Idris I,” Spotlight on the United
Kingdom of Libya
,
(Diplomatist Publications, Ltd., London, January, 195>9 )
,
p. 7.
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oil or anything else, was himself, the Sheik of that particular tribe.
The geologist tactfully apologized, and told the Sheik how, if oil were
discovered, it would greatly help his tribe and all the Libyan people.
This seemed to satisfy the old desert warrior, and he gathered his
tribesmen and departed.
The incident was reported to the Petroleum Commission, which in
turn sent a representative to visit the Sheik. He explained that oil
exploration was necessary for the country’s economy, and that oil might
prove to be one of the major financial hopes of the new nation.
This story is repeated here to show that the new government had
considerable difficulty in explaining the national good in face of such
strong provincial and tribal feeling. Granted, after nearly eight
years of independence, incidents of this type are becoming increasingly
rare, but they do exist.
Utilizing the limited media at their disposal, the new government
continually and conscientiously tries to keep the public informed as to
new measures and projects. Items stressing the national good and edi-
torials slanted toward patriotism appear almost daily in the newspapers
of Tripoli and Benghazi. Where the program has paid off for the tovm
dwellers, the hinterlands presented a problem. There are no newspapers
in the desert. The question then arose: ’’What of the people in the
interior?”
In coping with this problem, several unique innovations were in-
corporated. One such innovation saw the Libyan government accepting,
in fact, encouraging, the assistance of friendly foreign powers which
..
.
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had cultural centers operating within the country. These nations in-
cluded the United States, Great Britain, Egypt, Italy and Turkey.
From the United States Information Service, the Libyan government
received help in the magazine and brochure field. Government projects,
such as the waterspreading scheme of the Ministry of Agriculture, and
the emphasis on agricultural education by the Ministry of Education,
were helped considerably by illustrated brochures on the subjects which
were written and edited in Libya. In addition, the Minister of Edu-
cation requested, after the Arabic version of the brochures were dis-
tributed throughout the school systems, that English versions of the
same brochures also be distributed throughout the schools for use as
a training aid in the teaching of English.
These brochures helped in conveying the message of need in these
particular areas, and greatly enhanced the sympathetic understanding
of the efforts of Libyan-American technical assistance specialists in
the field.
American and British mobile film units traveled across the desert
to remote communities, showing films sponsored by the Ministry of
Health, which attacked such local maladies as trachoma and malaria.
Oftentimes, these film units, operated by Libyan drivers and techni-
cians, would meet a Bedouin tribe on the move. They would follow the
caravan until nightfall, and as the tribe set up its tents for the
night, would show their films. For many nomads, these vehicles brought
the first motion pictures ever seen in the desert. The motion picture
media was never more effective than it was in desert Libya. Time and
..
.
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time again, the audience would ask the operators to repeat a showing
after they had sat through three or four performance s of the same film
at one sitting.
In Benghazi, the British Army units stationed there had a small
radio station. Arabists of the British Information Center, collaborating
with their American counterparts, provided Arabic-language programming
through the facilities of the stand-by transmitter. These programs were
often supplemented by "canned" programs from the Voice of America of
the United States Information Agency, and from the British Information
Service.
In Tripoli, the American Cultural Center (USIS) produced an Arabic-
language magazine, "A1 Maarifa" (Knowledge), which enjoyed the blessing
of the Libyan government. Aimed primarily at bettering American-Libyan
relations, the magazine devoted much of its space to articles on Libya,
about Libya, and for Libyans. It carried information about all Libyan
government projects, and reported Libya’s position on world affairs in
the United Nations. Since many of the governmental projects were being
instigated in cooperation with the United Nations or the United States,
stories carried in "A1 Maarifa" went far to cement better Libyan-Ameri-
can relations.
Four miles east of Tripoli is the huge American Air Force Base,
Wheelus Field. One of the sources of entertainment for the base person-
nel and their dependents is the base television station, AJG-TV. As a
unit of the Armed Forces Network, the station features "canned" pro-
grams from the United States which are often three to four months old.
..
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Other programs, such as the news and local musical productions, emanate
from the station. Since the small transmitter permitted coverage of
the city of Tripoli, the Embassy’s Cultural Affairs Officer made a sug-
gestion for a weekly Arabic-language program. Air Force officials con-
curred with the suggestion, and a new media was opened for the Libyans.
By special arrangements with the United States Information Agency
in Washington, the new program got underway. Letters to American tele-
vision manufacturers were written asking for the donation of television
receivers. Twenty-five sets were dispatched and placed strategically
throughout the city in clubrooms, boarding schools, and coffee houses.
Through the cooperation of the base commander. Air Force enlisted techni-
cians were permitted to contract with the American Embassy to service
the sets.
A weekly newsreel, photographed in the United States on Sunday was
processed (no sound track) on Monday. At the same time, the Voice of
America Arab Service, produced Arabic scripts which accompanied the film.
On Tuesday, the film cannister was put aboard a commercial air liner for
London. On Wednesday, the cannister was transferred to a second commer-
cial plane, arriving in Tripoli late Wednesday evening. On Thursday,
the film was previewed by the American Information officer in the com-
pany of a local Arabic-speaking employee. This employee, who became
"Mr. Television" to Libyan viewers, read and re-read the script to syn-
chronize the speech with the film. On Friday, the Moslem Sabbath, the
program was put on the air. By American standards, this process might
seem very slow. However, by Middle-Eastern standards, the speed in
which the program reached Tripoli borders on the phenomenal.
..
.
'
,
.
16
In addition to the ten or twelve-minute film, the USIS narrator
would discuss the local news, as well as Libyan contributions in the
United Nations in New York. The news was generally followed by an
educational film.
On the surface, it would seem that all these measures introduced
to get the people thinking in terms of being Libyans rather than
Tripolitanians were rather simple. This is not true. The process is
long and arduous, and is still going on. With the birth of Radio
Tripoli, the first government-owned radio station in the country, a
new tool to help the government with this problem was created. Bom-
barded hourly by the Voice of the Arabs radio in Cairo, Libya now has
the means to further her nationalism through the new media. Being in
a "hollow” as far as the Voice of America is concerned, (the Tangiers
relay station of the VGA beams to a point in Cyrenaica on the Oulf of
Sidra, thereby missing Tripolitania to the south), that province now
has the means by which to better inform its people. As the station
grows in size and power, the service and efficiency will grow pro-
portionately.
The new station should go far in helping to eliminate tribal and
provincial thinking as a major barrier to nationalism. The result of
2fi00 years of foreign domination, it would be foolish to believe that
one station or one newspaper alone can solve the problem overnight.
And this problem is not endemic to Libya alone. A good example of this
type of thinking exists in our own country today with the attitudes
many Southerners have toward the American Negro. This attitude evolved
..
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from generations of slavery and was not changed immediately by the
Emancipation Proclamation of Lincoln. Legislation, therefore, is not
the answer, and fortunately the Libyan government is aware of this.
The problem of instilling nationalism in its people is one of the
most important problems facing any new nation. It is a problem that
is time-consuming. However, if the novice government can be made aware
of its importance and institutes the necessary measures to encourage
the nationalistic feeling, then that nation can proceed on its course
of political and economic stability.
.,
.
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SUMMARY
In attacking the problem of tribal and provincial thinking at the
expense of internal nationalism, the Libyan government has proceeded as
follows. With the limited media at their disposal, the government
attacked provincialism first through the educational system. In this
manner, they broached the subjects of national pride and national in-
terest through the literate population. Knowing that tomorrow’s gradu-
ates will be Libya’s future leaders, the government went to great length
to procure understanding from this group.
Simultaneously, the printed word and the spoken word of radio were
utilized to reach the masses. Friendly nations cooperated by providing
additional facilities lacking in the new nation. These sympathetic
nations also provided necessary funds to underwrite governmental pro-
jects and objectives.
By this cooperation, the Libyan government gained the use of new
media—radio, television, magazines, brochures, and motion pictures,
which enabled them to broaden their scope of attack. Through the use
of these media, understanding for governmental objectives expanded from
the urban centers to the sparsely populated desert regions.
The friendly nations also provided educational and technical train-
ing for Libyans in the use of these new media. Gradually, the desired
technical skill of native labor is being achieved.
Provincial and tribal thinking cannot be eliminated over night,
nor can it be solved by legislation. The Libyan government has recog-
nized the old customs and traditions, and has initiated an educational
..
,
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process before each and every change made. The old customs have not
been arbitrarily discarded. By stressing Libyan independence, the
government has been able to change many of the opinions of heretofore
antiquated and tribal-thinking people into groups of citizens who are
thinking in terms of the Twentieth Century.
This process is a time-consuming one, a process which has been
subjected to much criticism, especially among the foreigners. However,
it is working.
With each advancing year, the old wounds of rrovincial differences
are gradually disappearing. As a member of the Arab League and the
United Nations, and by military base agreements with friendly major
powers, the Libyan state today has become a source of great pride to
its people. By this process, the Libyan people have come to think in
nationalistic rather than in tribal or provincial terms.
* -5$-
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CHAPTER II
In Libya, as in other former colonial possessions, the existing
communications system at the time of the nation’s independence left
much to be desired. Having suffered the onslaught of four different
armies during three j^ears of savage warfare within its borders, Libya
emerged from the war to discover its communications system virtually
destroyed. The post-war British Military Administration, uncertain of
its tenure in Libya, did little more than to "patch up" the antiquated
communications system. War damage excluded, the communications of the
country, while adequate for colonial possession, were hardly suffici-
ent for an independent and sovereign state. Entire areas were isolated
from each other, and the telecommunications link between the country’s
two major cities was plagued with antiquated equipment and constant
technical difficulties.
Of its "surface communications," i.e. roads, railways, seaports,
air terminals, etc., Libya inherited a fairly good nucleus for its
future communications network. There was great war damage to these
facilities, but they could be rebuilt and repaired.
The "Imperiale Strada," the cross-country coastal road, was an
example of Italian engineering and ingenuity. Stretching from the
Tunisian border to the Egyptian frontier, l,lhO miles, this dual-lane
highway connects all the major cities and ports including Tripoli,
Misurata, Sirte, Benghazi, Barce, Derna and Tobruk.
U. S. Department of State, Background
,
No. 6567, Series 27,
Government Printing Office, Washington: December, 1957, p. 28.
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The "ribbon of asphalt," constructed at a cost of 78 million Lire, was
built by Italian engineers (as a military expedient) utilizing Libyan
laborers. Overcoming the hardships of the waterless desert, the great
road, which took four years to complete, was finally opened for traffic
in 1937. The Fascist Duce, Benito Mussolini, was present for its
official opening.
Aside from the coastal highway, there are only 560 miles of bi-
tuminous-surfaced roads in the country. The balance of the Libyan road
network is comprised of 7000 miles of unsurfaced roads and desert tracks.
Tripoli and Benghazi are the country's two major seaports. Derna
and Tobruk, in Eastern Cyrenaica, have modest port facilities, but both
were practically destroyed in the war. The latter, once a prosperous
port, was the "home" of the Australian "Desert Rats" of World War II
fame. It was 90 per cent destroyed after three years of warfare. Sunk
shipping blocked the harbor, and quays and dock facilities were leveled.
With the signing of technical and economic assistance agreements,
the new nation acquired the needed external financial aid to reconstruct
their port facilities. To date, -$1,881,600 has been allocated for the
repair and expansion of port installations. Minor repairs have been
made at Derna and Tobruk, however, since these port permit access only
to shallow-draft vessels, it is doubtful that their expansion will take
place in the immediate future.
( 12 )Henry Serrano Villard, Libya; The New Arab Kingdom of North
Africa
,
(Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 81.
(13)
Background
,
op. cit.
^United Nations, General Assembly, Communication of the Libyan
Prime Minister
,
(A/396I, September 17, 1958, New York, 1958), p. 2I1 .
.'
.
.
• t
„
**
22
The nation’s railway system, inherited from the pre-war Italian
provincial administrations, is quite small, and for all intents and
purposes, serves only as a minor supplement to highway transportation.
There are only two railroads in the country. In Tripolitania, one track
extends from Tripoli to Zuara in the west. A second track of the same
line runs southward from Tripoli to the village of Azizzia. The second
rail system is located in Cyrenaica connecting the capital city of
Benghazi and Barce, a distance of eighty miles. Little has been done
since independence to modernize or extend the present service.
In the field of aviation, Libya has fared better than in other
areas. There are seventeen airfields in the country, the bulk of which
are former wartime fighter and bomber bases. Idris International Air-
port, the former Castel Benito Aerodrome (Italian Air Force), is loca-
ted sixteen miles south of the city of Tripoli and is the largest civil
air facility in the country. Benina Airfield, serving Benghazi, has
recently had its runways extended and improved navigational lighting
installed. It is now classified as meeting international standards, and
with the extension of its runways, has four-engined aircraft capabili-
ties.
Tripoli is serviced by twelve major airlines, with an additional
two, Scandanavian Air Service and Olympic Airways, expected to begin
regularly scheduled flights in the near future.
Because of Libya's central position in North Africa, it became
aoparent early in the new nation’s history that the country should be
equipped with first-class airports and auxiliary services to meet the
needs of international, trans-African, and internal airlines. This
..
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objective has largely been fulfilled and has benefitted from the United
Nations, British and American assistance, both financially and person-
nel-wise .
In 195b, an expert from the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion prepared a draft Civil Aviation Law and, in connection with it, an
Arabic-English Lexicon of civil aviation terminology which has been of
considerable assistance to Libyan officials. v
To provide the meteorological services essential to the operation
of air traffic through Libya, the government’s Ministry of Communica-
tions requested the assistance of still another United Nations agency,
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). An expert from this organi-
zation has been assigned as the Director of the new Libyan Meteorologi-
cal Service. The efforts of this new agency are responsible for the
nation's ability to provide weather information to international aviation,
as well as meeting the climatological needs of the government, agri-
culture, industry and the general public.
Three of the nation’s largest airfields are foreign military in-
stallations. Wheelus Field, the sprawling American Air Force Base loca-
ted a few miles east of Tripoli, and its subordinate base in Benghazi,
represent the American military interests in the country. El Adem,
located south of Tobruk in Eastern Cyrenaica, is the principal Royal
Air Force facility in Libya. In addition, the British also maintain a
small detachment at Idris International Airport in Tripoli. Through
treaties, these foreign air bases and their supersonic jet fighters and
bombers represent Libya’s first line of defense in time of war.
* # *
(^Ibid.
( 16 ^ Ibid.
..
AIR TRAFFIC STATISTICS *
Idris International
(Tripoli)
Passengers (Metric tons)
Year Landings In Out Cargo In Cargo Out
1955 3,282 11,798 11,315 21*6 67
1956 087 19,821; 15,782 5i5 76
1957 5,596 26,751 22,711 559 210
1958 5,588 31,196 32,710 623 155
AIR TRAFFIC STATISTICS *
Benina Airport
(Benghazi)
Passengers (Metric tons)
Tear Landings In Out Cargo In Cargo Out
1955 n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1956 n.a 5,115 3,959 n.a. n.a.
1957 3,875 5,920 5,693 33 23
1958 3,555 5,198 5,980 37.3 33.5
* Source: Ministry of Communications, 1959
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TELECOMMUNICATIQNS
Telecommunications at the time of Libyan independence operated in
the most haphazard manner imaginable. Only the larger cities had a
municipal telephone exchange, and these utilized the most antiquated
equipment in the world. If one number in a bank of fifty shorted
out, the entire fifty phones were out of order. Furthermore, there
was no way to tell which instrument caused the shortage, resulting
in a number by number check to locate the faulty instrijment. Servic-
ing this equipment was even more difficult. The equipment was so old
that spare parts were unavailable even in Italy and France where the
equipment originated. External wiring, long damaged since the war,
was replaced with military wire from four armies that were scattered
throughout the desert.
Radio equipment for long-distance communications was equally ob-
solete. Wartime equipment, German, Italian, British, French, and
even some American Lend-Lease transmitters were pressed into use. As
with the telephone equipment, Italian radio apparatus in the urban
centers was long out-dated and spare parts could not be located.
As the interim British and French Military Administrations turned
over the reins of government to the Libyans, they left behind radio
and telecommunications equipment. This war-surplus equipment and the
jury-rigged, pre-war Italian apparatus was the basis of the Libyan
telecommunications system. At that time, the Director of the Libyan
Post and Telegraph was an Englishman, R. J. G. Blackett. This far-
sighted gentleman recognized the need and financial prospects of having
a modern and efficient communications system. His reasoning was that
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if Libya possessed an efficient communications network, her geographic
position would provide a lucrative link in the North African communica-
tions chain, a link that would enable the Libyan government to earn siz-
able international transit tolls. Blackett expressed his thinking in a
report to the Minister of Communications, and the plan was subsequently
passed on to the Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission for action.
This agency began contacting electronics firms in Europe and the United
States notifying them that the Libyan government was accepting bids for
the projects.
Two American firms, Hycon Eastern, Inc., of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
and Page Communications Engineers of Washington, D. C., decided to pool
their resources and apply for the Libyan contract as a joint venture to
be known as Hycon-Page Libya.
In September, 1906, the Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission
notified the American firm that their bid had been accepted and requested
that the firm begin an immediate study to determine Libya's need and to
contract and design the Libyan telecommunications system.
Hycon-Page, after its survey of the situation recommended a three-
point course of action:
1. To create an efficient Tripoli-Benghazi communications back-
bone, linking once and for all the two capital cities of the
country.
2. To expand this backbone by the use of radio, to permit the
transmission of news and information throughout the three
provinces.
3. To provide the urban telephone exchanges with modern equipment
and a large backlog of needed spare parts. This step will im-
prove and standardize inter-city telecommunications equipment
and procedures within the nation.
( 17 )K 1
'Personal interview with Dr. D. Davidson,
Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3, 19 $9
•
Hermes Electronics
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This course of action, with Mr. Blackett’s suggestion serving as
as a final goal, was accepted by the Libyan government, and the plans
were put into immediate action.
This is where the Ministry of Communications ran afoul of its first
major public relations problem. The Libyan-American Reconstruction
Commission earmarked -$£85,200 for telecommunications projects by the end
of the fiscal year 1957. Other funds from the United Nations and the
Libyan Public Development and Stabilization Agency, increased the tele-
communications budget considerably. When these figures were made known,
the furor began.
"With people hungry, what right did the government have to approve
such a large allocation for telecommunications at this time? How many
Libyans have telephones anyway? The foreigners are telling our leaders
what we should have—we know what we should have—full bellies, not
telephones i
”
Using the limited media at their disposal, the government argued
that only if Libya had an efficient communications network would its
world trade be exhilerated. More trade meant more money for the Libyan
economy, and a better economy would mean a higher standard of living
for all the Libyan people. The government further informed the public
that there were other funds to take care of needed agricultural pro-
jects, and sufficient funds in the treasury to take care of any emer-
gency relief programs. Once again the national prestige theme was
used, and as suddenly as the furor arose, it subsided. In this case,
the combined media was sufficient to handle the problem, and the
communications project continued.
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In carrying out the first step in the Hycon-Page plan, a unique
measure was introduced to span Libya's wide coastal plain. The diagram
below indicates the coastal area to be covered in the first step.
to Misurata, and then utilizing a radio system, known as "tropospheric
scatter transmission" to Sirte. At Sirte the signal would be re-trans-
mitted by the same system across the desert and the Gulf of Sidra to
Benghazi.
When the cost estimates were completed, it was found that charges
for the underground land lines between Tripoli and Misurata were extreme-
ly high, and it was decided to substitute low-power, microwave relay sta-
tions instead. These stations, located within sighting of each other,
picked up the signal on one side and re-transmitted it out the other.
.-
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The "tropospheric scatter Transmission" system is truly a uniaue
innovation. The diagram below indicates its basic principle.
The transmission is picked at one "tropospheric" station and is
beamed toward the next station in an upward direction. At the second
station, a similar beam is directed upward and toward the first station.
At a distance of approximately four miles above the earth, the beams
cross, and the transmission is "scattered" down the beam of the second
station. Since the signal is transferred at such a high altitude, there
is little distortion due to storms and other low-level interference.
The chief drawback to this system is that it requires great power,
and each station must have its own diesel-operated power plant with
auxiliary "stand-by" facilities for emergencies.
Beginning in September, 1956, the Hycon-Page firm initiated work
on the first stage, and by March, 1959, both the low-power micro-wave
relay stations and the "tropospheric scatter transmission" stations
were completed and operative.
# *
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RADIO
In 1956, following the Suez Crisis, Libya, being constantly bombarded
with Egyptian propaganda over the powerful Cairo-based Voice of the Arabs
Radio, recognized the need for a Libyan radio system. As it turned out,
this situation only accelerated Step 2 of the Hycon-Page communications
plan.
The American joint-firm was asked to survey the situation and to re-
port on the costs of equipment, installation and the necessary personnel to
man a radio station in Tripoli, with a similar station to be set up later
in Benghazi. Early in December, 1996, Hycon-Page’ s home office in the Uni-
ted States was given the official word by cable to purchase the equipment
for two temporary 9-kilowatt stations to be erected at Tripoli and Benghazi.
The difficult stipulation in the cable required that all equipment had to
be purchased in sufficient time to allow King Idris, in his Independence Day
(December 2li) speech to the people, to announce that the equipment had al-
ready been purchased and delivered. This stipulation had Hycon-Page offi-
cials scurrying all over the United States and Canada. The equipment had
to be in stock as there was not sufficient time to order it through normal
channels. The two 9-kilowatt transmitters were located at General Electric
of Canada, and the 90-kilowatt transmitter, slated for permanent use as
Radio Tripoli, was purchased from Westinghouse International. The balance
of the equipment was purchased throughout the United States. The entire
purchase, less the 90-kilowatt permanent transmitter, was airshipped to
Tripoli. This air shipment included the two 200-foot transmitter towers
which were broken down into sections. The entire shipment arrived in Libya
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in time for the King’s official announcement on December 2k, 1956. The
purchasing and delivery operation was accomplished in less than three weeks,
and within four months, the temporary Radio Tripoli was on the air.^O
In the early days, broadcasting was limited to morning and evening
transmission. With the inclusion of afternoon transmission some months
later, a full day of local broadcasting became a reality.
With the lack of qualified technical personnel in Libya, the recruit-
ment of a staff became a prime headache. John E. Reilly, a professional
broadcasting man with 20 years radio experience, was recruited by Kycon-
Page and sent to Tripoli to become Station Manager. Reilly was given the
difficult task of recruiting his staff and planning the programming of the
Tripoli station, as well as the Benghazi station which had been completed
soon after his arrival. For Arabic-speaking announcers, he recruited a
few Palestinians who had several years' broadcasting experience. His tech-
nical staff included natives of Switzerland, Germany, England and Lebanon.
Since telecommunications between Tripoli and Benghazi had not been
perfected at that time, the problem of simultaneous broadcasting at the
Tripoli and Eenghazi stations posed a major programming problem. To cope
with this problem, Reilly taped his daily programming one week in advance,
and air shipped the duplicate tapes to Benghazi.
With the transmission of news, which cannot be taped in advance,
Reilly had a bigger problem. Among the various Libyan government agencies
( IPAv
'Personal interview with John Memishian, former project director
of Hycon-Page Libya. Hermes Electronics Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
July 3, 1959.
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is an organization known as the Office of Press and. Publications. Born
during the Suez Crisis of 1956, this office has the function of "passing”
on every news item carried in the local news napers BEFORE it is printed.
With the arrival of Libyan broadcasting, this office also became heir to
censoring all programs to be presented, including the news.
Reilly, a former manager of a Boston radio station, is almost a
fanatic at transmitting the news first and factual. Libyan censorship,
therefore, became a major barrier to his operation. The problem was not
insurmountable, however, and with typical Gaelic ingenuity, he convinced
Fuad Kabazi, newly appointed Chairman of the Broadcasting Commission, that
the installation of an American Wire Service teletype machine in the Office
of Press and Publications would greatly enhance the transmission of world
events to the Libyan people. Today, as the news comes off the teletype
wires, a driver brings the "approved" news to the station. While not ex-
actly the quickest method known, the system has proven satisfactory.
-
55- % #
IMPROVED TELEPHONE EXCHANGES
The third step in the Hyc on-Page plan is currently underway. The
antiquated equipment in the urban telephone exchanges are being replaced,
and new transmission lines are relieving the war surplus lines that have
been in use since the Second World War. Already a part of Mr. Blackett's
philosophy has been realized. International telephone communications have
been completed between Tripoli and Rome, Tripoli and London, and. Tripoli
and the United States (via London). The first call to the United States
from Tripoli was made by Mr. William Murphy, Administrative Officer of the
American Embassy, in early 1957.
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The internal telecommunications plan calls for a year-by-year ex-
tension of the existing land lines and the incorporation of high-frequency
radio transmission circuits to isolated communities. These systems will
be interchangable, and when completed, will help to unify the entire nation
for the first time in its history.
The total cost of the improved telecommunications system, which in-
cludes the detailed engineering, and installation of all equipment, build-
ings, power, land and rights of way or easements, will be approximately
$9*000,000.^°) The bulk of this figure is covered by foreign assistance
grants, and it is expected that if oil is discovered in commercial quan-
tities, the balance and operational costs will be covered by government
petroleum revenues.
.V.
PUBLIC RELATIONS FROBLEMS
During the early days of Libyan independence, the communications situ-
ation in the country was deplorable. Roads, ports, airfields, telecommuni-
cation lines, railroads—all forms of communications had suffered extensive
war damage. The facilities and equipment that had not been destroyed was
either badly damaged or obsolete.
With the absence of an effective communications network, the nation
was disunited, with entire areas isolated from one another. Large foreign
assistance funds began pouring into the infant nation and communications
( 19 )Final Report for a Fundamental Plan of Telecommunications in
the United Kingdom of Libya, Hycon-Page, Wakefield, Massachusetts: September,
1956, p. 5.
’.
,
.
.
.
•
.
.
. . .
3h
as with other sub-standard fields, received a small allocation from the
government. From 1952 through 1956, the communications budget was mini-
mal. The United Nations, which carried the brunt of the telecommunications
financing during those early years, allocated only $826,000 over the four-
year period. ( 20) The bulk of these funds went to restoring the pre-war
system rather than expanding it to unite isolated areas. This is by no
means a criticism, since before any expanded system can be inaugurated,
there must be an existing system from whence to begin. The United Nations
efforts during those early days attempted to restore the old system in
preparation for the new.
In the area of surface communications, the government faced nominal,
if any, public relations problems from within the country. Externally,
its efforts were directed to appealing to the world body and to friendly
nations for funds to restore the great havoc wrought by war. Four armies
had see-sawed back and forth across the face of Libya for three long years,
and the resultant destruction had been thorough. Even before Libya was
admitted to membership in the United Nations, her cause had been pleaded
by friendly nations on the floor of the General Assembly, and by invitation,
a Libyan delegation arrived in New York to present its needs to the world
body.
The success of these earlier efforts are measured by the amount of
economic and technical assistance funds Libya has received.
(20) United Nations, A/3961, Op. cit.
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The first major public relations problem the Libyan government had
to face in the communications field came with the decision to modernize
the national telecommunications system. Angry letters of protest poured
into the nation’s newspapers. The forum of the "Coffee House" became a
beehive of stormy protests. The people simply did not understand the
need for such a large allocation of funds for what they considered a
luxury. By utilizing the limited media at their disposal, the government
presented its case to the people. When the masses were told of how the
telecommunications system precluded an increase in their living standards,
the angry roar subsided to a murmur. In presenting their case to the
people, the government stressed the "prestige" angle, an item close to
every Arab heart. The results of their efforts found active support
where before there had been only derision.
The next major public relations problem, and one that has yet to be
solved, concerns the operation of the national radio—Radio Tripoli.
After the initial pride of having a national radio subsided, com-
plaints began to mount against the type of programming, the Arabic used
by the announcers, etc. Some of the more Irresponsible newspapermen
joined the trend and used their columns to attack the new station with al-
most monotonous regularity. Even though the lack of technical skill with-
in the country prevented placing Libyans in key broadcasting positions,
the attacks on "foreigners working for Radio Tripoli" continued. Prior to
these attacks. Station Manager Reilly began a training program for Libyans,
anticipating the day when they will assume the responsibility for the
operation of the complex equipment. Though the training program for the
,.
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Libyans was common knowledge throughout the city of Tripoli, it did not
prevent the malicious editorial attacks in the city's newspapers. Ameri-
can observers on the scene report that the pattern of the derogatory arti-
cles was familiar, and written in terms of vehemence that betrayed their
foreign instigation. ( 21)
The government has taken steps to better orient the people concern-
ing their radio station, however, some of the government articles in de-
fense of the station's personnel have been misinterpreted as an attempt
to "cover up". Their efforts to date have been met with severe criticism.
Neighboring countries have picked up the issue and have aided and abetted
the cause of the antagonists. Perhaps if the government was less concerned
with what is being said and more concerned with who is saying it, the re-
sulting action might go far in correcting the situation.
From a humble beginning, the Libyan Communications network has pro-
gressed at a remarkable pace. The early public relations problems facing
the new government entailed almost exclusively the preparation of documents
for use in soliciting immediate financial aid to restore the modest pre-
war communications system.
This accomplished, the government ran afoul of its first major public
relations problem when the decision was made by government officials to
(21)
'U. S. Department of State, Quarterly Economic Summary
,
Unclassified
Foreign Service Despatch No. 188, Tripoli: January 12, 19^9, p. 23.
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give the nation a long-needed and modern telecommunications network. To
the masses, this decision was like demanding caviar for a people that did
not even have bread in their homes. Criticism to the government decision
was loud and hostile. To a nation that was 90 per cent illiterate, the
need for an extensive telecommunications system was not understood, and
was considered a luxury that they could not afford. The government met
the problem head-on, and by utilizing the limited media at their disposal
(six Arabic, two English and two Italian newspapers, and the "stand-by"
transmitters of the British Military Radios in Tripoli and Benghazi) a
thorough picture of the proposed communications system was presented.
Particular emphasis was given to the "prestige" factor, and to the require-
ment of such a system if the national living standards were to be improved.
The success of the public relations efforts in dealing with this problem
can be measured by the suddenness with which the criticism disappeared.
The current public relations problem facing the Libyan government
in the field of communications, centers on the foreign personnel manning
the national radio stations. Daily criticism in the local press cries
out for Libyan supervision and operation of their own stations, and a
neighboring nation’s radio system has taken up the hue and cry against
"imperialistic interference."
Government public relations efforts to date have only served to keep
the issue alive. The simple fact that there are no native personnel with
sufficient technical ability to man such a complex operation, cannot be
stated for fear of injuring national pride. The Libyans are aware of
their educational and technical shortcomings, but they do not want to
.V . ‘
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hear it, especially from their government. Thus, the issue must be handled
with great care. Interested observers have pointed out that the pattern
and language of the vicious editorial attacks have a similarity to com-
parable copy used to excite the populations of other Middle Eastern coun-
tries. It is the author’s opinion that these attacks are Egyptian-inspired
and Russian financed. Should the problem be approached from the point of
view of suppressing foreign insults to Libyan dignity, perhaps the issue
would be short-lived.
As previously stated, the problem is a current one, and the public
relations efforts to date have met with little success. Some government
officials have voiced their belief in rather extreme terms, such as giving
the "foreign" personnel of the radio station a vacation, and then closing
down the station for want of a capable staff. In this manner, a popula-
tion denied access to a national radio might think twice before supporting
such anti-national criticism.
The author does not agree that this suggestion would solve the problem.
If anything, it would only perpetuate the antagonism, as foreign propa-
gandists would tell the Libyan people that they were being punished by their
government.
There must be a better solution. Certainly now is the time in Libyan
history that the government could benefit from an organized public relations
department. An outside firm could not be employed to handle this situation,
since it world be adding more "foreigners" to the government payroll and
provide further fuel for the antagonist’s fire.
Nor can the government simply ban such editorial attacks and the
vicious "letters to the editor." What little freedom of the press that
,.
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exists in Libya must be preserved. Therefore, the author would suggest
that as a possible course of action, the Libyan government should in-
vestigate where these "anti-foreign" criticisms are coming from. If the
author’s feeling about the origins of these attacks is correct, then the
government could "expose" the source in the press and use the very "artL-
foreigner" tactics against those who would disrupt Libyan governmental
projects.
.T '
CHAPTER III
One of the major requirements for any nation today is a thorough and
efficient mass educational system. As many of the former colonial pos-
sessions emerge to inderendence
,
the educational system of that nation is
often deficient. Such was the case in Libya.
The underdeveloped nation which gains its political freedom is faced
with a problem of great proportion in this area. One of the first steps
any new government must take is to make available and encourage the mass
education of its citizenry. The problem is not important merely from the
population point of view, for regardless of size, a new nation can only
survive if its people are literate and educated. Thus, the justification
for a national education system.
In certain new nations such as Libya, the need for a mass education
system was acute prior to independence, and required the immediate atten-
tion of the new government in instituting the system on a crash basis.
Under Italian domination since 1911
,
the Libyan Arab had little opportun-
ity for an education. The Arab child who was fortunate enough to get into
school was made to learn the language of his masters and could only look
forward to a fourth grade education. This was felt ample for the non-
Italian child of the "new Libya."
Prior to Libya's independence, the United Nations Commission to that
country reported:
"The core of any economic and social development plan must in-
evitably be an educational and training program. The principal
untapped resource of Libya is its human skill, for a population
which is 90 per cent illiterate and almost completely lacking
„,
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in trained technicians cannot fully explicit its existing re-
sources or successfully manage its afMrs in a highly com-
petitive world unless its inherent talents are developed by
education and training." (21)
During the post-war era and before its actual independence, the
Libyan pro-tem government, under the guidance of the world organization,
attacked the national problem of education as it did with agriculture,
health and natural resources. In the pursual of alleviating these na-
tional problems, special problems of a public relations nature presented
themselves. It is the special problems which occurred in the drive for
a national education system that will be investigated in this chapter,
but before doing so, it is necessary to understand the national problem
first.
The national problem in education was a major one. The first item
on the agenda called for the establishment of a Libyan school system.
The system advocated, and still maintained today, created a primary
school of six years followed by a secondary school of five years.
Since Arabic was to be the official language of the system, the
next major barrier facing the government was the problem of securing
capable teachers for the expanded program. Through the assistance of
the world organization and friendly Arab nations, a large number of
foreign, Arabic-speaking teachers were imported for employment in the
new Libyan school system. Among these were over 700 Egyptians sent to
Libya by the Egyptian government. 23 These teachers enjoyed financial
remuneration unique in the teaching field. In addition to the salary
( 22 )v
' United Nations, Council for Libya, Supplementary Report,
Second Annual Report of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya
,
(No. 17 A (A/l9U9/Add. 1) "(Paris, 19^2), p. 16.
^ ^Washington Post and Times-Herald , January 26, 195>8> P« 38.
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paid, them by the Libyan government, a subsidy matching their salary was
paid by the Egyptian government. Other Arab teachers from Palestine,
•Syria and Lebanon did not enjoy this privilege, a situation which led to
considerable friction among the system's teaching staff.
A survey conducted by the United Nations Commission to the new nation
revealed that at its independence, Libya could boast of only fourteen
citizens who had had one year or more of college training. 1 2b) This
figure is indicative of the deplorable educational standards for native
Libyans under the Italian regime.
The same report noted that of those students receiving an education
of any kind under the Italians, 60 per cent were city dwellers. Since the
rural and nomadic population of the country represents a large minority,
this fact only substantiates the sub-standard emphasis that the Fascjd:
regime placed upon native education.
If the educational system was deplorable for Libyan children in
general, the education of female children was even more so. The Com-
mission study revealed that prior to independence, illiteracy of women
in the country was estimated at an unbelievable 99 per cent. This fact
cannot be blamed entirely on the Italians, as it was the result of anti-
quated tribal beliefs concerning the inferior status of women. In this
respect, Libya is slowly evolving toward the emancipation of women. Con-
ditions are not as yet equal to those of Morocco, Egypt or Lebanon, however,
the situation is improving. This problem is of a social nature and can
only be solved satisfactorily from within. The Libyan women for the most
(2U)New York Times
,
April 2, 195-7, p. 1*1
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part are still veiled, but for one eye* when seen in public. No man,
save her immediate family, may see her unveiled. The situation is more
prevelent in tribal-centered Cyrenaica than in Tripolitania, but even
there, progress is being made. The appearance of other 7/omen, especial-
ly from fellow-Arab nations, attired in western clothes and seen in
public, is going far in revoking the old vrays. Women occupying govern-
ment positions as teachers and administrators are the pioneers in this
social reform movement. One organized body, the Women's Association,
is the leader of the movement for the emancipation and eventual suffrage
of Libyan womankind.
*
THE DRIVE FOR EDUCATION
Education in Libya today, only eight years since independence, has
evolved from the simple art of bringing up children to virtually a passion,
even a fever. Whether you are visiting a Libyan city or a small village,
groups of boys and girls, book satchels in hand, are to be seen on their
way to or from school.
It is not the compulsion of the state 's authority that drives them
to the classrooms. It is a deep craving for knowledge, a craving which
was, and is, encouraged by an intelligent government.
This encouragement, appearing in the form of government-sponsored
editorials in the local newspapers and through brochures, was quickly ab-
sorbed by a people new to independence, a people who felt a strong per-
sonal inadequacy. Arabic-language broadcasts eminating from British
Military radio stations in Tripoli and Benghazi, found avid listeners
eager to heed the government's advice.
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Since independence, this craving for knowledge applies to the adult
population, as well as to the children, and has spread to almost epidemic
proportion. A UNESCO report describes the situation as "one of the fast-
est growing educational systems in the world. "(25) The desire for learn-
ing encompasses all age groups. The UNESCO report noted that when one
kindergarten class opened in Tripoli for a maximum of 30 pupils, it was
overwhelmed with over 300 requests from parents anxious to register their
children. ( 26 )
A brief look at the history of education in Libya in recent times
shows that it is divided into three periods. The first, under the Italian
occupation, is that period where Libjrans were not only discouraged, but
often prevented from taking part in the general education programs. The
aim of the Fascist authorities -was to make the Libyans into disciplined
and obedient colonial subjects who would work under the orders of their
masters, but would not be able to compete for any of the recognized pro-
fessional or leading positions.
The second period is that of the post-war Eritish administration.
During this period a great deal was done to encourage the masses to par-
take of the existing educational system, especially at the elementary
level. But the failure to provide and train enough Libyan teachers and
the disregarding of efforts to increase the number of university students,
were the major weaknesses of education at that time. The British did
^ New York Times, January 8, 1959* p. U3.
( 26 )lbid.
..
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yield to the people ’s demand for the expansion of the educational pro-
gram, but not fast enough, nor on the vast scale required by the cir-
cumstances.
The third and final period is that era since independence, when the
new Ministry of Education assumed the responsibility of education for
the Libyan people. This agency assumed full control over all educational
activities, the planning of needed schools, and supervised their actual
construction. The Ministry operates on the federal level, and works
through the Nazirates of Education of the three provinces. Recognizing
the desperate need for native teachers, this agency financed and en-
couraged the opening numerous teacher-training colleges and technical
schools, and. supervised the opening of the first institution of higher
education in the country—the University of Libya.
The following tables indicate the progress made since 19l*3 in the
field of elementary, preparatory and secondary education. - !
'
;
ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS: TEACHERS AND PUPILS
(191*3 -1*1* to 1957-58)
Academic
Year
No. of
Schools Male Female Total Teachers
1*3-1*14 69 6,170 l*ol* 6,571* 201
1*1*-1*5 100 6,990 620 9,610 331
1*5-U6 116 11, 805 759 12,651* 387
1*6—1*7 120 12,1*38 1,397 m, 635 1*59
1*7-1*8 11*0 15,261 2,376 17,637 1*67
1*8-1*9 166 21,662 3,132 2l*,79l* 763
1*9-50 181 23,1*81 3,757 27,238 899
50-51 193 28,266 3,823 32,089 1,021*
51-52 201 31,967 1*, 920 36,887 1,156
52-53 225 36,520 5,599 1*2,119 1,180
53-51* 263 1*0,61*7 7,193 1*7, 8I1O 1,602
51*—55 312 1*7,150 9,108 56,258 1,781*
55-56 372 51*, 369 11,051* 65,1*23 2,102
56-57 1*15 61, 020 13,398 7U,H8 2,51*9
57-58 1*33 73,158 16,1*00 89,558 2,733
(27 )Hefter, 1 -Ti. Cjt.
, p. 16
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PREPARATORY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS AND
THEIR TEACHERS: (I9ii7-U8 to 1957-58)
Academic
Year
No. of Schools
Preparatory - Secondary Students Teachers
U7-U8 h 23U 18
h8-b9 3 293 29
U9-50 3 385 36
50-51 h 628 U9
51-52 h 795 59
52-53 5 978 83
53-5U 7 1,571 111
5U-55 7 2,395 189
55-56 8 2,806 199
56-57 9 It, 650 301}
57-58 37 8 5,271 358
The progress made with regard to teacher and training centers is
recorded by the following statistics for the school year 1957-58:
INSTITUTIONS OF TEACHER TRAINING
School Number Students Teachers
Teachers School 2 1,283 96
Women Teachers School 2 280 35
Agriculture 2 205 18
Commerce and Industry h i}25 51
Handicraft Institute 1 70 111
Mechanical Engineering 1 22 h
Another indication of the progress achieved can be gathered from
the annual increase of the national education budget. Financial figures
in the graph below are indicated in Libyan Pounds (LL). A Libyan Pound
is roughly equivalent to $2.80 on the world market.
V.
.
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EDUCATION BUDGET
Financial Year Budget
£2-53 61*2, 837 (iL)
53-5U 693,132
5h-55 1,193,609
55-56 1,075,661*
56-57 1,61*1,167
Since the economy of the country is based largely on agrarian and
pastoral activities, the need for agricultural education was immediately
recognized.
In February, 1952, less than 50 days after their independence, the
Libyan government sought the aid of the United States Operations Mission
to Libya, in the setting up of two agricultural education institutions.
These schools were located at Sidi Mesri, outside the city of Tripoli, and
at El Awelia, located in the Barce Plain of Cyrenaica.
On that date, an American, Mr. Ray Russell, a University of Missouri
graduate and a specialist in agricultural education, arrived in Libya
under the auspices of the American Point Four program to assume charge of
the school at Sidi Mesri.
The situation which greeted Mr. Russell at the new school site was
far from optimistic. Horses had been stabled in what was to be his living
quarters, solitary confinement cells remained in one of his future class-
rooms, and the debris of three different armies—Italian, German and
British, had collected in the one usable building.
•.
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The need for such a school was acute, and the Libyan government
spared nothing in renovating the buildings. Some nine months and
12,000 Libyan Pounds later, the school was ready to receive its first
students. '
'
The original thirty students enrolled at Sidi Mesri were chosen
from all sections of Tripolitania on the basis of competitive examina-
tions.
The curriculum was set up on a split-day basis. In the morning,
half of the students attended class while the other half worked in the
field learning the practical application of agricultural procedures.
In the afternoon, the process was reversed.
The school, being a specialized secondary institution, offered
courses in mathematics, languages, science, agriculture, and the social
sciences. Though Arabic was established as the official language of
instruction, English was made mandatory for all students, with Italian
being taught on an dective basis.
The agricultural courses included irrigation, soils and fertili-
zers, blacksmith ing, farm bookkeeping, dairy farming, fruit tree spray-
ing and pruning, and truck gardening.
Administrative officers of the school were appointed by the Ministry
of Education, while the faculty was composed of American and Middle
Eastern teachers.
Adequate medical and hygiene facilities were made available at the
school and supervised athletics was required of all students. Religious
(28) [patrick J. Mahoney, III], Student Farmer , (Beirut, Lebanon:
Near East Regional Service Center, (USIA), 19^6 ),"p. 2.
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training was not overlooked, as an employee. Essayed 7rohammed Bederi
read daily from the Koran for the all-Moslem student body.
At Sidi Mesri, a unique innovation was incorporated to supply
spending money for the students. Each student was allocated a section
of irrigated land on the school grounds, and was loaned vegetable seeds
and fertilizer. Because of extremely favorable weather conditions,
four to five truck garden crops can be harvested yearly. The vegetables,
carrots, radishes, peas, lettuce, and tomatoes were planted and. cared
for by the students in their free time. When a crop is harvested, the
vegetables are tallied in a school account book and transported to the
commisary of the American Air Base, Wheelus Field, to be sold. When
the profits are returned to the school, a secretary deducts the cost
of the seed and fertilizer ( a very nominal charge) and the balance is
credited to the student in his school account. Since Sidi Mesri is a
boarding school, the student has little use for money on the premises.
However, when the occasional trip to town is permitted, or during vaca-
tion, the student has his own pocket money. According to school officials,
this system gives the student a feeling of independence and has helped
in teaching them the value of money.
In Cyrenaica, the El Awelia school operates on a different prin-
ciple. Each student is given a small monthly subsidy by the provincial
government, but other than this, the two schools are more or less
identical. Each is under the direct supervision of an American Point
Four specialist who maintains his residence at the school.
An outstanding example of the success of these schools is Sidi
Mesri T s Mohammed Abdulsalam Qaja. ’When this 17-year old boy from the
,
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desert community of Beni Ulid first heard of the examinations to be given
for entrance to this school, he walked fifteen miles across the desert to
take the competitive examination. On the basis of his examination score
and his personal character, Mohammed was selected by Mr. Russell to enter
the school. On his arrival at the school, Mohammed spoke only Arabic,
and that with a heavy regional accent. After completion of the four-
year course, this young man spoke fluent English as well as perfect Ara-
bic. At the conclusion of his course of study, he was given an entrance
examination for an American university. The name of the institution
was blocked off from him, and as far as he was concerned, it was just
another examination required for graduation. He surprised everyone ex-
cept his instructors by scoring a very respectable 96.8 per cent on the
examination, and was subsequently sent to the State of Utah on an Ameri-
can Educational grant to further his study of agriculture. Qaja’s success
alone more than justifies the faith that the Libyan government had in
establishing this type of institution.^^)
-M- J«.
EDUCATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS
The government’s position toward the public relations problems in the
area of education was a difficult one. At first, the greater difficulty
arose with their program of influencing the people to get an education be-
fore the necessary educational facilities were even available.
An example of how difficult the situation was in the early days cf
independence is reflected in the advertisements which appeared in the
( 29 ) See Appendix nA"
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government-owned Tripoli newspaper, Tarablus al-Gharb . These advertise-
ments solicited secondary school graduates for positions in the Libyan
Diplomatic Service. Since then, however, requirements are far more
rigorous. But in the beginning, the lack of formally educated person-
nel forced the new Foreign Office to recruit secondary school graduates.
To the sophisticated reader, the early public relations offerings
in the medium of the press might appear as "patting their own back."
But bearing in mind the educational deficiency of the nation in its in-
fant years, this "self-appreciation" was not only desirable, but quite
necessary from the point of view of the Libyan government.
Consider the difficulty of the Libyan governmental agencies at that
time. They were utilizing the available media in stressing the need for
mass education. The educational facilities existing at that time were
inadequate to handle the increased enrollment resulting from the public
relations effort. With the people crying for an education, and the situ-
ation was just that, the building campaign of the Ministry of Education
could not keep pace with the demand.
The initial problem of getting the people to want an education was
a relatively simple one. Government insistance on education only en-
flamed the latent desire of the long-dominated oopulace. The big prob-
lem came in the expanding of educational facilities. And as a result,
each new school completed brought an unusual amount of publicity which
was unfortunately interpreted as "back patting" by some, notably among
foreigners.
As the program of expanding existing school facilities began to
make progress, the Libyan government then concerned itself with the
»*
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problem of procuring foreign teachers to staff the new schools. Teachers
were recruited from sister Arab nations on an annual contract basis. The
plan, devised by the Ministry of Education, called for a continuing num-
ber of foreign teachers annually until such time as native teacher train-
ing programs could produce their own instructors.
As previously stated, the bulk of these teachers came from neighbor-
ing Egypt. This gave the Egyptians a great propaganda advantage (during
the rise of the Nasser regime), especially during the Anglo-French in-
vasion of Egypt in the Suez crisis in 1956.
If a student in a Libyan school was given an outside reading assign-
ment, the Egyptian teacher would give him a note which he took to the
Egyptian Cultural Center in Tripoli or Benghazi. At this modern, well-
stocked library, the student presented the note to the librarian and re-
ceived the book free of charge as an outright gift. The books, -which
were shipped to the Cultural Center in the duty-free Diplomatic pouch,
were second-hand, having been used by an Egyptian student the previous
year. On the fly-leaf of each book was a written note from an Egyptian
schoolboy, such as: "To my Libyan brother with best wishes," and the boy's
name
.
This practice, along with religious, ethnic and language similarities,
gave the Egyptians a great advantage in the propaganda field.
The realization of this practice prompted the Libyan government to
procure increased numbers of foreign teachers from other Arab lands, nota-
bly among Palestinians and Lebanese. The pro-Western Libyan government
felt the need to counter that increasing anti-Western influence on its
future leaders
,.
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In reshaping the nation's educational program, a number of problems
were presented. Aside from the building shortage and the securing of
capable teachers, such problems as revision of textbooks, curriculum, and
the establishment of new standards became pressing.
Until recent years, most of the texts used in Libyan schools were
produced and printed in Egypt. With the advancement of the printing
industry within the country, more and more texts are being prepared at
home. This is the result of the efforts of a five-man American techni-
cal team which was assigned in Libya to assist the government in the
preparation of improved textbooks and other teaching materials. An
allotment of LL 91>000 ($>25h, 800) was made by the United States Techni-
cal Assistance Program for textbook production in Libya. There are
many advantages to this project, one being that a student studying
history is now learning the subject through the eyes of Libyans.
With the passing of a law making birth registration compulsory,
it is now easier for authorities to estimate future needs. Kindergartens
take children from five to seven years, and the following six years are
spent in primary schools which are springing up at a fantastic pace all
over the country. A further five years ' schooling is now available
free of charge for those fortunate enough to live near a school. Even
in the remote Fezzan, the southern desert province, there are more than
5,000 children attending school. ( 3-0
Libya, Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, Report to
the Prime Minister
,
July 1, 1957, p. 16.
^-^Hefter, Or , cit
. ,
p. 17.
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SPECIALIZED EDUCATION
In face of the ancient practice of relegating women to a status of
subservience, the advancement of female education in Libya since its
independence has been commendable. One of the schools of Cyrenaica which
has exemplified the trend toward the emancipation of women is that opera-
ted by a young Libyan woman. Miss Amal Shennib. Inspired by the pioneer
leader of the emancipation movement, Mrs. Hamida El Anaeizi, a teacher
for 30 years. Miss Shennib has done wonders with her school.
Having never attended a teacher’s training school, Miss Shennib
is a product of eight years in the Libyan Secondary School system. Now
only 2li-years old, she is headmistress of a school of bOO children be-
tween the ages of five and eleven years who are attending co-educational
classes under a faculty of twelve instructors. Where co-education is not
typical in Libya, it has become less rare in the few short years since
independence. The movement has the blessing of the Women's Association,
an organization of literate and cultured women. This organization, while
not yet successful in winning the vote for female citizens, has succeeded
in opening an ever-widening horizon of new interests for women until now
behind the veil.
The government has also taken into consideration the problem of edu-
cating children of nomadic tribes. A United Nations survey in Iraq, which
had a similar problem, was used by the Libyan government in the formulat-
ing of decisions toward this large minority. In addition to fulfilling a
social need, the construction of boarding schools for these children
serves another purpose. The government has found that while the nomadic
children are attending school, their parents have the tendency to stay
..
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near them. For economic reasons, the gradual reduction of nomadic
wandering is a great advantage. It is true, however, that at present
most of the children attending these schools return to the old family
life with the tribes after their education. It is the hope of the
government that these children will see the opportunities available to
them, and after finishing school they will move to the towns to live
and work. '
* * *
A CLOSE LOOK AT THE OVERALL EDUCATION PICTURE
To point out the magnitude of the educational problem in Libya,
the presentation of some official statistics is in order. Nearly eight
years after the nation’s independence, Libya can only boast of 10 per
cent literacy among its people. For a nation roughly equivalent to
one-quarter the size of the United States, and with a population of
1,091,830, the literacy figure might seem deplorable. This figure
should not be attributed to self-complacency, but rather as a result
of centuries of foreign domination. As aLarming as the literacy figure
might be, there are great areas of the world where the figure may run
considerably higher, and from these areas will emerge new nations, some
in the immediate future.
The literacy figure in Libya is ample justification for the immense
interest in education, and necessitates the rapid pace which the govern-
ment is moving in the mass education program for its citizens.
( 32
'Ibid., p. 18.
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The estimated 1958-59 attendance in primary schools is 93,000, a
sizable increase over the previous year. (33) Enrollmen is heavily
weighted toward the first few years.
The Secondary School attendance figure for the same year is esti-
mated at 6,253. Enrollment in the secondary schools has quadrupled
between 1953 and 1957. This figure includes vocational and teacher-
training students.
The teacher-training enrollment is estimated at 1300 at the two
training colleges in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Over 200 primary
school teachers were graduated from these institutions in 1957, with
an additional 300 being graduated in 1958. Unfortunately, at the
present time, there is no facility available for the training of
secondary-school teachers.
In the field of higher education, 286 students are enrolled at
the University of Libya. Established in 1955 in Benghazi, this institu-
tion held its first graduation exercise in June of this year. A former
palace of King Idris, the University was donated by the Libyan monarch
as an expression of concern for the educational problem existing in his
country. Manned by a faculty of thirty (including an American Chancellor),
this institution is composed of three schools: The School of Science,
located in Tripoli with fifty-three students; The School of Commerce,
with eighty, and the School of Arts with an enrollment of 153 students.
The latter two schools are located in Benghazi.
C gq )
'United States Information Agency, "Report on Libya", Washington,
B. C., (RO/NE-30-59), February 6, 1959, (Mimeographed), p. 2.
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Another indication of the inroads women are making in Libya, is
shown by the fact that Libyan women were permitted to matriculate at the
University for the first time in 1957. '^4 '
i
In addition to the growing facilities for education in the country,
Libyan students are beginning to go abroad for higher and specialized
education. This is accomplished through scholarships made available by
friendly nations, as well as by the Libyan government itself. An esti-
mated 238 Libyan students are presently studying in Egypt, h.2 in the
United States, a small group in England, and 36 others in other Western
European countries. The American University of Beirut in Lebanon has
20 Libyan students, and at least one Libyan is reported to be studying in
Soviet Russia. (35)
It is interesting to note that the Libyan government spent consider-
able time and effort in arranging external scholarships for its citizens.
While not labeled a public relations function, the efforts of the govern-
ment in this field undoubtedly utilized many public relations practices.
Educational grants became items on the diplomatic agenda with friendly
nations. They were also entered in the financial assistance budget
presented to the United Nations, the United States, and Great Britain.
With the dispensing of dl exploration sites to foreign companies, the
educational grant was included in the terms of barter. Certain companies
agreed to train Lib^-ans in skilled technical positions. This training
included instruction in the United States, as well as on-the-job train-
ing in Libya.
(3lt)
(35)
Ibid
.
Ibid.
..
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The establishment of foreign cultural missions in Libya saw an
increase in educational scholarships for Libyans. Spain, for example,
provided a limited number of scholarships to Libyans to study Islamic
Art in that country.
From the United States, the Libyan public relations effort resulted
in the allocation of LL 90,000 Pounds ($252,000) for the training of
Libyan students and technicians outside of the country. —'
SUMMARY
From the first day of its independence, Libya has had an acute
national education problem. In attacking this problem, the government
became concerned with accompanying public relations problems. The public
relations efforts in this area were directed toward the following prob-
lems:
1. Encouraging the Libyan people ’s desire for education.
2. Publicizing the expanded construction of schools by the
Ministry of Education.
3. Procuring foreign Arabic-speaking teachers.
b» Publicizing the establishment of local teacher-training
institutions.
5. Procuring external financing for school construction,
teacher training institutions, and foreign scholarships
and training grants.
6. Procuring external financing and publicity for specialized
educational institutions, such as vocational agricultural
schools, female education, and boarding schools for the
children of nomadic tribes.
(36)Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, Op. cit
.
,
p. 15.
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These six major problems constitute the bulk of the public relations
efforts during the first eight years of independence. They have not been
completely successful, nor will they be for years to come. In the quest
for a final solution for these problems, the government has acknowledged
its public relations responsibility to the Libyan people. In the pursuit
of its public relations objectives, the government’s efforts have become
almost routine, and responsible officials know that a final solution can
only be brought about when the great national problem of educational
deficiency has been conquered.
.,
.
CHAPTER IV
The pulse of any country may be measured by its economy. In many
nations emerging to independence, this pulse is understandably weak,
and when glaring deficiencies exist in the areas of education, communi-
cations and national health, the prospect for a stabilized economy in
the immediate future is vastly remote.
Such a situation existed in 19^1 when Libya faced the world as
a free and sovereign state. The financial backing of the nation at
that time rested in the hands of the world organization and friendly
foreign powers which had agreed to underwrite the infancy of the new
country.
Internally, the economy of the nation was in a deplorable state.
The lack of water power precluded industrial growth, and sparse rain-
fall, Libya’s only source of life-giving water, permitted only the
barest agricultural and pastoral enterprises. The urban centers of
the two major provinces, especially in Cyrenaica, were still wallow-
ing in the ruins of the Second World War. Since educational opportuni-
ties were denied or restricted to native Libyans in the preceeding
thirty years, illiteracy was rampant in the country. The levels of
technical and professional skills were equally low for the same reasons.
Nor did the immediate future hold optimistic visions for the in-
fant government. Devoid of natural resources, Libya, the one-time cen-
ter of Graeco-Roman civilization in North Africa, faced the bleak
future with little more than faith, typical Arab patience, and a gener-
ous measure of intestinal fortitude.
c.
.
,
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During the two years prior to its independence, Libya prepared
for the day when it would join the world family of nations* Guided
step by step by the United Nations Commission for Libya, an accelera-
ted learning process was required of all future government leaders.
Since the country had never known independence, no one in the country
knew anything about the mechanics of government. A.11 future leaders
had to learn, and learn the hard way. The independence date having
been set by the world organization (on or before January 1, 19!?2),
the future leaders were required to gain as much knowledge as possible
in administration, parliamentary procedure, legislation and diplomacy,
and all the while, the time factor hung over their heads like the
Sword of Damocles.
The United Nations officials did their jobs well, and on December
2li, 19f>lj one week before the United Nations deadline, King Idris de-
clared the independence of his new nation.
While the country was still under the aegis of the world organi-
zation, many Libyans took a long look at their future nation’s economy.
Since the exploitation of possible mineral resources was only specula-
tive at that time, the nation based its hopes on the one activity in
which the majority of Libyans participated—agriculture. The choice
was a logical one, and the government directed most of its early efforts
in this field. Seven years after independence, the Libyan Prime Minis-
ter, Abdul Majid Goobar, substantiated this choice in a communication
delivered on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations:
’’The majority of the Libyan people, probably more than eighty
per cent, are dependent, directly or indirectly, upon agriculture
j'
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for their livelihood, and since the country is yet without
proven mineral resources of commercial value, it is of the
utmost importance that its agricultural resources should be
developed and improved to the greatest possible extent." (37)
With the cooperation of friendly nations and the world organiza-
tion, agricultural specialists arrived in Libya to cope with the prob-
lem of improving and expanding agricultural production.
Agronomists experimented with new types of seeds, and experimental
farms were incorporated to test the new varieties. The loose, sandy
soil was found conducive to the growth of peanuts, or groundnuts as they
are known in Libya. This crop has since become the principal export
crop of the country.
As the existing farmlands began to produce better cereal and vege-
table crops, the need for reclaiming some of the desert wasteland be-
came apparent. The Italians had, during their domination of Libya,
made appreciable gains in land reclaimation. However, during the war
and the years following it, this land, being uncared for, was little
by little lost to the desert.
The first step taken in land reclamation was a scheme known locally
as "dune fixation." In this scheme, Bermuda, or crab grass, is planted
in square patterns, each several meters long. When viewed from the air,
this pattern looks like a mass of picture frames placed end to end. The
purpose of this scheme is to permit the roots of the grass to grow deep,
thereby serving as an anchor to the sandy soil. This is necessary,
since the land being reclaimed shifts from place to place with each
successive breeze.
( 37 ) United Nations, General Assembly, Communication of the Libyan
Prime Minister
,
(A/3961, September 17, 195>8) (New York), p. 1.
(38)
United States Foreign Service Despatch (No. 188) (Tripoli:
January 12, 1959), p. 9.
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Some of the land, using "dune fixation, was slated for reforestation.
Young Eucalyptus trees were planted in the center of each square. This
tree, which requires the minimum of moisture to grow, further anchored
the loose soil. In addition to their use in government forest preserves,
some trees were given to Libyan farmers to provide shade and to help
anchor the soil of their farms.
Throughout the three provinces, numerous wells, some dating back
to the Roman era, permitted irrigation on a small scale. The irrigation
method used in Libya was antiquated. Crops were planted in small patches,
each enclosed by a mud wall several inches in height. This method, while
economical with precious water, can oniy be satisfactorily used where
small-yield farming is practiced. Since the nation was in dire need of
expanding its agricultural production, American-style irrigation was
adopted in lieu of the old system. This method, used where entire fields
are to be irrigated, was met with a major barrier when the government in-
formed the foreign agricultural specialists that it could not afford to
import the necessary water pipes required for large-scale irrigation.
Another method had to be found.
The agricultural specialists discovered that caliche deposits, a
clay impregnated with crystalline salts, was very plentiful in certain
areas of Libya. This clay could be molded in the same manner as cement,
and was available at a minimal cost. A Point Four agricultural station
experimented with the local material and it was found to be satisfactory.
Thus, the canal linings for future irrigation schemes were guaranteed.
Another constructive measure introduced to improve agriculture vras
waterspreading. In Libya, were the annual rainfall is less than nine
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inches per year, the -winter, or rainy season, is quite short. In the
past, the winter rains would, fall in the mountains and the water would
rush down and across the plains, only to be wasted in the sea. A way
had to be found by which the water could be slowed down sufficiently
to permit its absorption into the dry soil. Waterspreading was the
answer •
The principle of waterspreading is not new. It was first used
in Libya by the Romans during the Second Century. Had these earlier
engineers possessed a modern transit which would have permitted them
to follow the earth’s contours with their dikes, waterspreading would
have been perfected nearly 2000 years ago. As it was, their dams and
dikes had to be repaired after each heavy rainfall.
The theory of waterspreading is simply the holding of water in
one place long enough to permit it to be absorbed into the ground.
To do this, a dam is constructed across a known flood path. As the
rushing water hits the dam, it backs up and forms a pond. Excess
water then runs off along curved dikes to the adjacent area, where
it is again held. A series of these dikes are so constructed to keep
the water moving in an ever-increasing area away from the normal river
(Wadi) bed. In this manner, the water is slowed down sufficiently to
enable the parched land to absorb most of it. In well-designed systems,
less than one per cent of the water escapes to the sea. (39)
The absorption, or penetration of water into the soil, determines
the size and quality of crops to be grown on the land. In some countries
Mahoney, Illj
,
Waterspreading in Libya, (Beirut,
Lebanon: Near East Regional Service Center, (t t3IA)7 195 1?), p* U.
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where clay makes up the greater part of the soil, only nine inches of
water penetration is needed to grow a crop of barley. In sandy soil,
as in Libya, 30 to 36 inches of penetration is needed to grow the same
crop of barley, and to get this amount of penetration, water must be
held from eight to ten hours. Free, unchecked water will run its course
in only four to five hours. Thus, the need for waterspreading.
The government sponsored two such schemes in the Uadi Beni Ulid.
and Wadi Targallat areas of Tripolitania
.
Workers for these projects
were paid for their labor in American gift wheat, and the overall
supervision of the project was directed by Mr. Don Davis, a range
management specialist employed by the American Point Four program.
The completed projects were put to a severe test during the
unusually heavy rains of April, 1955. Their success prompted the
Libyan government to offer similar facilities to the farmers of the
area. Where heavy machinery was used in the construction of the pilot
systems, Libyan farmers were taught to build smaller systems utilizing
camel power and man power. These systems proved to be successful
against smaller water courses.
RESETTLEMENT OF DISPLACED PEP-SONS
With Libyan independence, the government became aware of the
existing hardships of a potential agricultural force—landless young
farmers. These men, and their fathers before them, had been employed
by wealthy Italian land owners, and with Libya 1 s independence, they
M Cl c' •
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Irrigation channels made from local caliche were
used at the Wadi Caam resettlement scheme. 12,!?00
linear meters of these canals were constructed and
lined before the first family resettled at the
reclamation site
.
67
no longer had a job* They did not have capital with which to buy land,
nor even to buy seed and fertilizer had they owned land. The Ministry
of Agriculture came up with a plan to resettle these young men and their
families in order to utilize their farming skills in contributing to the
deficient food production of the country.
The site chosen for this project was near Wadi Caam, eighty-six
miles east of Tripoli. Located near one of the two flowing streams
in the country, the site selected consisted of a 720-acre plot which
vrould support 120 families.
The first step in this project concerned the building of a large-
scale irrigation system to utilize the water from Wadi Caam, instead of
letting it escape to the sea. Caliche canals were used extensively in
this project, thereby reducing the overall cost.
The land was then cleared by modern machine methods, and the first
families selected for resettlement began to arrive. This step was in
conjunction with a community development program of the Libyan-American
Joint Services. Fifty-four houses were constructed, and 36,780 man-days
of employment were given to Libyan laborers. Each of the fifty-four
farms were then planted with 3\ acres of grain and an acre of alfalfa. ^
! °
y
With the allocation of additional funds to the resettlement program, the
balance of the 120 houses will be constructed in this, the pilot re-
settlement scheme in the country.
Oio)
( Tripoli
:
Libyan-American Joint Services, Wadi Caam Resettlement Scheme
,
June 18, 19^9), p. 1. (Mimeographed.
)
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PRESENT AGRICULTURAL CONDITIONS
Since agriculture is the present mainstay of the Libyan economy, a
look at some recent statistics will indicate the progress made in this
field in the past two years. Food for the local market has become in-
creasingly plentiful, and each year the increase tends to stabilize the
cost index for food, temporarily offsetting a growing inflation.
SALES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
IN TRIPOLI’S GENERAL MARKET
January - October
(metric tons)
Product Measure 1957 1958
Local Wheat tons 155 27k
Barley n 2, 000 2,267
Maize ti 38 66
Potatoes it 1,752 2,1*21*
Onions it 1,380 1*03
Tomatoes it 2,213 1,1*90
Broad Beans it 76 101
Dried Pepper it 36 122
Eggs dozen 117,207 11*1,662
Olive Oil liter 212,500 360,000
Manteca it 61,1.00 37,900
These figures and the agricultural export statistics for the same
period, reflect the improvement in farm production within the country.
While these figures represent only those from one province, they are
sufficient for the desired measurement. This is due to the fact that
Tripolitania has the major protion of the nation’s population, and the
figures for Cyrenaica, while considerably lower, are in approximate
proportion to those of Tripolitania • Figures for the Fezzan, the south-
ern desert province, are unavailable, and as far as exports are concerned
^•^Report of Tripolitania Nazirate of Agriculture
,
January, 1959.
^Report of Department of Agriculture, Administration of Tripoli
tania, 195>9.
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the only crop raised there in sufficient quantity for export is dates,
and even this crop is exportable but one year in three due to lack of
sufficient rainfall in the province.
TRIPOLITANIAN EXPORTS
January - October
(metric tons)
Product 1957 1958 Product 1957 1958
Peanuts 6,182 6,691 Oranges 1,233 2,553
Potatoes 2,231 671 Castor Seeds 1,132 1,976
Barley 0 1,003 Almonds 117 1*53
Wheat 0 5oo Carrubes 225 3h2
Tomatoes 99 21U Dates lh 135
Lemons 161 81 Tangerines 9 7h
Carrots 82 105 Millet 128 9h
Melons 1 70 Fresh Peas 10 h7
Grapefruit 18 39 Plums 10 36
Apricots 19 30 Fresh Beans 25 25
Green Peppers 111 25 Onions 12 0
Sheep Skins 311 302 Wool 133 170
Goat Skins 103 213 Goat Hair 25 53
Cattle Hides 122 107 Camel Hair 22 8
Where the foreign market will have to be increased if Libyan foreign
credit is to be extended, the bulk of the past and present exports have
been directed to Malta and Italy, Libyan wines, which rival the products
of Tunisia and Algeria, must be exported. It's only market locally is
among foreigners and to the Italian and Jewish minorities. This is due
to the tenets of the Moslem faith which forbids the consumption of al-
coholic beverages. At present, negotiations are underway in an attempt
to find a market for Libyan wines in Germany and France.
(U3) Foreign Service Despatch, Op. cit«, p. 9
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PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURE
The public relations problems which arose in this area accompanied
the introduction of modern agricultural methods and practices by the
Ministry of Agriculture. These methods, which were to supplant the old,
time-proven methods that had existed in Libya for centuries, created a
public relations problem which the government had not anticipated.
Agricultural specialists of the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), and the American Point Four Program (ICA), began
publicizing on a nation-wide basis the advantages of the hybrid grain
and new variety of vegetable seeds. The Ministry supplemented this ef-
fort by broadcasting their official sanction of the large-scale planting
methods that were to be introduced. Their combined efforts did little to
change the attitudes of the Libyan farmers who had for centuries used the
old accepted methods in producing their marginal crops.
The government then realized that before they could expect these
farmers to change their farming habits, they would first have to offer
them something better. They further realized that the written and
spoken word of the media could not accomplish this alone. The farmers
simply had to be shown.
Agricultural research stations set up two model farms on which the
new hybrid grain seed and the improved varieties of vegetable seed were
introduced. The resulting crops provided visible proof to the farmers
that the government had their best interest in mind when they advocated
the modern agricultural expansion program. Farmers came great distances
to visit these experimental stations, and to see for themselves the
..
.
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kinds of crops that could be raised in Libya, and on a large scale. It
required no agricultural specialist to recognize hearty vegetables. The
farmer could see for himself. The planting methods were explained to
groups of farmers while they were visiting the model installation.
The most effective public relations tool in this project (which is
still going on today) was, and is, word of mouth. This tool accomplished
more than all the media combined.
Other agricultural projects produced still greater public relations
problems. For example, after the government had proven the waterspreading
principle to the farmers of the Beni Ulid and Wadi Targallat areas, the
suggestion was made that similar but smaller systems could be constructed
by local farmers for use on their own lands. These farmers, who had seen
the projects constructed by modern machine methods, doubted that the small
farmer could duplicate the system, even on a smaller scale, because of
the lack of needed machinery.
When government spokesmen told the farmers that machinery was not
needed for the construction of a small system, the farmers smiled and
went their way. Had they not seen the big tractors and earth moving
equipment? Did the government officials expect them to move such large
amounts of earth by hand? What does that "big-shot" know about farming
anyway?
The Ministry of Agriculture asked the assistance of American Point
Four specialists in helping to build acceptance for the small-scale
waterspreading system. These specialists, with the help of Libyan
laborers, constructed a small waterspreading system entirely by man
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power and camel power. Four additional hand-and-eamel projects were then
constructed at Sirte which covered approximately 30 acres. Two of
the projects were subjected to heavy rainfall soon after completion, and
exhibited appreciable results. In the Nalut-Uazzen area of Western Tri-
politania, two small hand-built systems were constructed. Since their
completion, sweet clover has been grown of a size and quality unknown to
the area. Experience has shown that these small systems can be built
at a cost of approximately llr.OO per acre of ground covered by the water-
spread.
In the past, it was not uncommon to discover instances where a
farmer planted his crop, and when the yield was minimal, he accepted
this misfortune as "the will of Allah."
Today, with the introduction of modern agricultural methods, the
Libyan farmer now realizes that he himself contributes greatly to the
size and quality of his harvest. Chemical fertilizer has been made avail-
able for the first time in history to the small Libyan farmer, and
another public relations effort has resulted in a regional "self-help"
program, in which the farmer is loaned needed equipment and permitted
to purchase seed and fertilizer from the government at cost.
Funds for this program came from the Libyan-American Reconstruction
Commission. This organization, established by Parliamentary statute
in April, 1955, consists of a Libyan chairman, (The Minister of Finance)
and three other Libyan and two American members. Its executive director,
(k^Osee Appendix "B", p. 8.
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Libya, A Brief Politi-
cal and Economic Survey, July, 1956, p. 18.
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Mr. Irvin Hannum, is an American, and unlike the Public Development and
Stabilization Agency, whose activities are quite similar, it is not a
Libyan Government agency. (^6) This organization manages the American
technical and economic assistance funds of the Libyan-American Joint
Services.
->c }£ -Sr
THE HOPE FOR A NEW NATIONAL PRODUCT
If the day arrives when Libya can feed all of its people and have
enough left over to export on a large scale, the economy of the country
will still be seriously hampered for future progress unless a new nation-
al product, one of great commercial value, can be developed within the
country.
Today, the country’s main hope lies in the search for petroleum
deposits whose discovery in commercial quantities would rescue Libya,
as it has other Arab states, from its existing marginal economy." 11 ' In
June of 19!?5 j a Petroleum Law was published and a Petroleum Commission
was set up under the supervision of the Minister of National Economy.
This commission regulated the terms on which concessions would be granted
to oil companies. The basic tenet of these regulations calls for an
equal division of profits between the concessionnaire and the Libyan
government.
Great Britain, Report on Libya
,
(Central Office of Information,
No. R/3682, August 13, 1957), p. 15. (Mimeographed)
(^Ibid., p. 11.
..
.
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Following the establishment of the petroleum law, fifteen companies
from the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, France, and Ger-
many applied for and received large concessions. Exploration for the
most part was limited to surface and subsurface geophysical surveys.
The Petroleum Commission set a i960 deadline for the full explora-
tion of each concession. With time growing short, nany of the oil compa-
nies have begun sinking "wildcat" wells on their concessions before the
i960 deadline is reached. On this date, 25 per cent of each concession
must be released to the Petroleum Commission for possible reassignment
to other companies.
The results of these "wildcat" operations have been encouraging.
The Oasis Company (Ohio Oil Company), has located oil at 3ahi, (600
barrels a day) and at Dahra, (500 barrels a day). Esso had a promising,
but as yet unevaluated, strike near the Algerian border, as did the
French company, Compagnie des Petroles, in the Fezzan. In all, there
are eight companies at present engaged in "wildcat" operations.^ 1 -)
The most heartening news to date was the recent (June 12, 1959)
announcement by Esso Standard (Libya) Inc., of an oil strike at their
Zelton concession in the heart of the Cyrenaican Desert. This well
produced 17,500 barrels per day, and was "brought in" and tested for
12 hours. The production from this well is from limestone between the
depths of 5,ij60 and 5,665 feet.
The Libyan people are watching the current oil explorations with
keen interest. Indeed, the location of all in commercial quantities may
(US)Foreign Service Despatch, cit
., p. 18.
.
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make all the difference in the world to the standards of living of all
Libyans. Oil would immediately change the nation’s passive budget into
one of flourishing surplus. 1
Even if the search for "black gold" does not reach the level anti-
cipated, the Libyan economy has been substantially bolstered by oil ex-
ploration within the country. One American company alone, Esso (Libya),
has spent nearly $25*000,000 to date in the country. Other American,
British, French, Dutch and German companies have spent an estimated
$150,000,000 in Libya/#)
* -;$ #
The public relations problems of the Libyan government in dealing
with oil exploration involved labor unions, choice of concessions, water
rights to Bedouin tribesmen, and living conditions of Libyan laborers in
remote oil camps. Externally, the public relations problems entailed
keeping the major oil companies interested in Libya as a possible source
of oil, and to the establishment and maintaining of a good relationships
between the Petroleum Commission and the concessionnaires.
.
Internally, many public relations problems developed at the con-
cession sites. For example, certain oil companies were persuaded to
drill water wells near their camp sites to provide water for the flocks
of Bedouin tribesmen. The government exerted this effort and the oil
companies cooperated because the concessions were located on tribal lands
^^Hefter, C
. . cit . , p. 37.
'Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), Hews Release , (June 12, 1959)
p. 3.
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The drilling of water wells, while an additional expense to the oil compa-
nies, created a better feeling among the tribesmen and a healthier situation
for all concerned. These efforts were accomplished by government officials,
not through mandatory decree, but by sympathetic cooperation of both con-
cessionnalre and government.
In dealing with the anti-Western Petroleum Workers’ Union, the oil
companies had some uncomfortable days during December, 1958. Union-in-
spired criticism had appeared in the nation’s press condemning existing
wage levels and working conditions. Public relations-minded government
officials sought to work out a solution for these problems, and in effect,
served in a concilliation capacity. These officials soon discovered that
the criticism directed toward the oil companies centered on some local
contractors utilized by the oil companies, and not the companies themselves.
Agreement was reached on a minimum wage for unskilled Libyan laborers,
and some long-overdue measures were adopted to ameliorate the harsh living
conditions that had prevailed in some of the camps in the past.
EXPLOITING THE HOST PLENTIFUL PRODUCT
When an underdeveloped nation emerges to independence, it must have
some form of barter to enable it to procure the necessary external finan-
cial backing. In some countries, known mineral deposits may be exploited
to gain this assistance. Where the presence of mineral deposits in com-
mercial quantity is only speculative, as in Libya, the new nation must
seek another product to procure foreign capital.
^
^Foreign Service Despatch, Op, pit
., p. 2lu
.
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In Libya, the most plentiful product of the country at the time of
its independence was real estate. The government very wisely concluded
military base rights agreements with two major Western powers, thereby
assuring the nation a source of external technical and economic assis-
tance funds, as well as external protection of the new state.
The first such military agreement was concluded between Libya and
Great Britain. The ties between the two nations have been very close
since the British Eighth Army liberated the country during YJorld 'War II.
British military forces remained in Libya after the war where they served
as administrators of the provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. After
Libyan independence was proclaimed in 1951, negotiations by both nations
sought to give the oresence of British military units in the country
legal form. The legality was sought in a form which would not derogate
in anyway from Libya's dignity and sovereign independence. Foilowing
a visit by the Libyan Prime Minister to London, the two countries signed
a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance at Benghazi on June 29, 1953.
Under the provisions of this treaty the two countries agreed to
assist one another in the event either nation was engaged in "war or
armed conflict", and to consult together if hostilities appeared imminent.
These provisions were not to prejudice rights and obligations arising from
the United Nations Charter or the Covenant of the Arab League. The two
countries also agreed to provide each other all military facilities and
assistance in their power in order to provide for mutual defense. In
return for facilities accorded to the British military forces in Libya,
Britain agreed to provide financial assistance to its ally. From 19^2
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.
.
.
78
to the end of 1958, Britain has provided over 21 million pounds ($58,880,000)
in direct economic and technical assistance funds, in addition to several
interest-free loans. Under the articles of their treaty, Britain has also
undertaken the training and equipping of a 10,000-man Libyan Army.
In return for this financial assistance, the British received the
right to station military forces in Libya. ' - 2) District military head-
quarters for British forces are located at Tripoli and Benghazi, -with
communications and logistic centers located in and around these capital
cities. The Royal Horse Artillery is stationed at Homs, in Tripolitania,
and Armoured Regiments are permanently stationed at Sabratha, in Tri-
politania, and in Barce, in Cyrenaica. In addition to army forces in
Libya, Britain’s Royal Air Force maintains a detachment at Idris Inter-
national Airport in Tripoli, and a squadron-size detachment at El Adem,
near Tobruk, in Cyrenaica. ( 53
)
-V- .V.
Libya also benefits from large economic and technical assistance
grants from the United States. These grants grew out of the Libyan-
American Base Rights Agreement signed on September 9 > 195^j following a
visit of the Libyan Prime Minister to Washington. Under this agreement,
which is valid until December 2li, 1970, and continuing thereafter on a
basis of one year’s notice of termination, the Americans were allowed to
’’occupy and develop for military purposes’’ an airfield located a few
( ^ ^Report on Libya, Op. cit
., p. 13.
^Ibid.
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miles east of Tripoli. This base, Wheelus Field, is at present the largest
American air facility outside the continental limits of the United States,
and is headquarters of the 17th U. S. Air Force. Aircraft at this 150
million dollar installation are responsible for the security of a
Mediterranean area exceeding the size of the United States itself.
1
' - -
/!
The U. S. Air Force also maintains a small installation at Benghazi, as
well as guided missile test ranges in the Tripolitanian desert.
The agreement specified that American aircraft should enjoy rights
of access and egress from its installations, and it was further provided
that nothing in the treaty should conflict with the United Nations Charter
or Libyan obligations as a member of the Arab League. In return, the
Americans undertook to provide 1|0 million dollars which will be paid over
the eighteen years to 1971 inclusive. During the first seven years of
the agreement, payment is to be made at the rate of four million dollars
annually, and afterwards, at one million dollars per year. The bulk of
Libyan external financial assistance was assured by the final provisions
of the agreement. This provision stipulates that the American government
will "consider sympathetically" further requirements for economic aid.
Since 195h, American assistance funds have benefited Libya by 18 to
20 million dollars annually. The total ai d since 19%h has exceeded
85 million dollars in technical assistance. These figures do not include
^-^Mary Thayer, Washington Post & Times-Herald
,
January 26, 1958,
p. 25.
United Press International dispatch, Tripoli, February 18, 1959.
..
.
,
.
80
land rentals and other military payments to the Libyan government . ( '
During three successive crop failures caused by drought conditions in the
country, Libya was provided vr±th nearly 5>0,000 tons of relief wheat by
the United States in direct grants. (5?)
-> *
Here, then, are the results of Libyan diplomacy in exploiting the
nation's most plentiful commodity. While these efforts are primarily in
the field of diplomacy, certain everyday public relations principles
were used by the Libyan government in acquiring the most advantageous
position possible. These real estate agreements enabled the country to
proceed on its course to economic stability until such time as agricul-
ture and possible mineral resources are developed to their’ highest degree.
It should be mentioned, however, that Libya's strategic geographic
position preempted its ability to negotiate for such financial assistance.
In the current East-West cold war struggle, Libyan real estate, (which is
less than three hours flying time to the Soviet Union) became far more
valuable than had the country been located elsewhere in Central or Southern
Africa. Its strategic locale, therefore, was the chief bargaining power
for Libyan diplomats in their motivation and desjre to improve the lot
of the Libyan nation.
Libyan officials were quite active public relationswise in their
dealings with American and British military personnel in the country.
(56) prew York Times
,
December 2, 1958, p. 31.
(^7 ^Report on Libya, Or. cit . , p. 111.
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Permits to military personnel allow duty-free entry of personal pos-
sessions, such as automobiles, furniture, etc. While these exemptions
to Libyan import laws might be interpreted as "preferential treatment,"
the Libyan government was aware that foreign military spending within
the country would greatly enhance the Libyan economy, and would pro-
vide much-needed employment for many of its people. The "preferential
treatment" was, therefore, justified.
SUMMARY
As agriculture is the present heart of the Libyan economy, the
government had directed the major portion of its efforts in this area.
As in other areas, public relations problems emerged from pressing
national problems, and agriculture was no exception.
The major public relations problem in this area concerned the cre-
ation of a favorable acceptance to new agricultural methods and procedures.
This was accomplished in spite of strong tribal and provincial atti-
tudes toward fanning. Actual model farms were constructed and stocked
with new hybrid grain seed and with improved varieties of vegetable
seed. The resulting crops served as visible proof of the new methods,
and word-of-mouth was probably more influential in changing the atti-
tudes of Libyan farmers than all the media efforts combined.
Similar difficulty was encountered when other government projects
designed to improve the agricultural production of the country were in-
troduced. Such projects as "dune fixation," the incorporation of modern
..
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irrigation methods, waterspreading, and the resettlement of landless
farmers, all required considerable nublic relations efforts before th©ir
acceptance was obtained. .7hen people have been farming in one manner
for centuries, it takes more than media efforts to make them change.
If they can be shown visible proof of the value of new methods, then
they are likely to change. Such was the case in Libya, and the public
relations efforts of the Libyan government in the construction of model
schemes, constituted their major efforts in these areas. Thereafter,
the public relations efforts entailed little more than an occasional
publicity campaign of completed projects in order to maintain the in-
terest of the farm bloc.
In the search for oil—the principal hope for a stabilized economy-
brought about public relations problems unknown in the new country.
The problems confronting the government were difficult, and it
meant that the government would have to be concerned with foreigners
living in their country. As such, the problems required careful hand-
ling. The government knew that it must encourage foreign oil firms to
look for the "black gold" in their country, since the technical skills
necessary for such an enterprise viere not available among its citizenry.
At the same time, it meant the government would have to be con-
cerned with the foieign company's internal personnel policies in such
matters as minimum wage laws and the living conditions of Libyan em-
ployees at the remote desert camps.
One such problem was mediated by government officials which dis-
closed that a malpractice claim against a particular oil firm should
..
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have been directed against a local contractor employed by the firm. This
settlement, and subsequent improvement in the living standards of Libyan
employees maintained the status quo.
In exploiting Libya’s most plentiful commodity—real estate—the
government became involved in international public relations. From
Britain and the United States, Libyan diplomats acquired vast economic
and technical assistance funds in return for military base rights agree-
ments. In accomplishing this, the Libyan government made sure that no
infringement on Libyan sovereignty was possible, thus retaining its
national dignity.
The public relations efforts in this area resulted in Libya’s
ability to proceed on its course to economic stability until such time
as its agriculture aid possible natural resources could be exploited to
their fullest degree.
..
;
.
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CHAPTER V
Libya, like most of the North African littoral, enjoys a healthy
climate. While its people are robust and generally healthy, they are
subjected to a number of serious diseases, three of which have reached
alarming proportion.
An early survey conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO),
revealed that while having special health problems, Libya was virtually
free from many of the diseases which normally plague underdeveloped
nations. Typhoid and cholera, for example, are usually contracted by
drinking contaminated water from rivers or ponds. Where people have
to get their water from deep wells, as in Libya, the risk of getting
these diseases are obviously much less.
In many countries of the Middle East, even washing in river water
is dangerous because of a worm endemic to warm climates which causes a
disease known as bilharzia. This worm causes serious infection to the
bladder and intestines. Millions of people in the Nile Valley are in-
fected with it annually, and it has been estimated that bilharzia de-
creases Egyptian production by over 30 per cent each year. -) Since
there are no rivers or ponds in Libya, a case of bilharzia is an ex-
treme rarity.
Another disease prevelent in this part of the world is hookworm.
Causing severe anemia, this germ breeds in damp soil, so obviously, it
cannot thrive in Libya.
K. Lindsay, "A Glance At Libya," World Health Organization
Newsletter
,
VIII (January, 1955 ), p. 2.
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Malaria, which causes more serious illness throughout the world
than any other disease, is spread by a type of mosquito which breeds
in ponds or stagnant water. In Libya, these conditions existed pri-
marily in the coastal salt marshes near Tauorga, in Tripolitania, and
after a concentrated effort by Libyan and American medical specialists,
the incidence of malaria was greatly reduced, and the disease ceases
to be a major health problem in the country.
What then are the major health problems in Libya? It is necessary
to discuss them first, since the public relations problems facing the
government in the health field are resultant from the national health
problem.
Aside from the maladies common to us all, bronchitis, lumbago,
indigestion, etc., there are three major health problems dangerous to
the extent that the Libyan government allots 10 per cent of its nation-
al budget in combatting them. These diseases, and in their order of
magnitude in Libya are, acute diarrhea, trachoma and tuberculosis.
The first problem, acute diarrhea, attacks primarily the babies of
the country. All over the globe, according to the World Health Organi-
zation, this disease is the chief cause of death between the ages of
one month and one year. It is particularly bad among Libyans, and
about 5000 babies die of it there every year.
The causes of this disease are associated with poverty and ignor-
ance, and the best way to prevent it in the long run is to raise the
living standards of the people, and to teach mothers proper infant
care.
..
*
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The second major health problem is the eye disease known as trachoma.
A disease endemic to most of the desert countries of the world, trachoma
is especially prevelent in Libya. It has been estimated by United Nations
medical specialists that nearly 30 per cent of all Libyan children have
this disease. Locally, the incidence varies from place to place. In the
village of Suk el Juma, a few miles east of Tripoli, the incidence is
reported to be 80 per cent, but in other villages it is less than h per
cent. While the disease is a major problem to government health offi-
cials, it is not nearly as serious as in some Middle Eastern countries.
The third major health problem is tuberculosis. Again, the incid-
ence of this disease is not as bad as in other countries. While the
exact statistics are not known, it is estimated that between twelve and
fourteen hundred Libyans contract this disease annually. This is about
the same proportion as in Britain, where there are 60, 000 new cases of
the disease each year. (^9)
Here then are the three major health problems which have faced and
plagued the infant Libyan government. The public relations problems
which resulted from these health problems were many, and each varied
considerably in their size and scope. Basically, they entailed a con-
centrated educational effort which utilized the media and medical
specialists as lecturers in attacking the nroblem internally, and the
diplomacy of Libyan government officials in seeking the financial assis-
tance of friendly nations, as the external approach.
^'Ibid., p. U.
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'
„
87
Budget-wise, the new government allocates about half a million
pounds ($l,li00,000) annually in the fight against disease. This figure
represents approximately 10 per cent of the entire national budget, and
is the usual proportion spent in countries which have a far greater
health problem than Libya.
As a general prelude to initiating national health projects, the
Libyan government, through the Ministry of Health, instituted a major
sanitation program. Travelers are continually amazed at the cleanli-
ness of the country, especially when compared with fellow Arab states.
Tripoli has been called the cleanest city on the Mediterranean, and
justifyable so. Certainly there are not many places in the world where
the rubbishman calls twice a day as he does there. Government-employed
street sweepers are to be seen everywhere, and modern street-cleaning
vehicles have been imported to keep the main traffic arteries swept and
watered down daily.
This sanitation effort is not only reserved for the larger cities,
but has expanded rapidly into the smaller villages. The efforts in
sanitation have been attributed to lowering the incidence of disease
in the country.
The public relations efforts in the field of sanitation were di-
rected toward publicizing the program to the extent that the population
accepted and cooperated with the scheme, and to defending the govern
ment's decision of employing such a large number of street sweepers,
rubbishmen, etc. As to the latter, many felt that the employing of a
11 small army1 ' of street sweepers and rubbishmen was a drain on the na-
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tional econorry, and felt that the money could be put to better use in
other programs. It became the job of the Ministry of Health to justify
their actions, and to create a favorable attitude toward the sanitation
program by means of the media of the press and radio.
Once the sanitation program was successfully underway, attention
was given to the principal disease problems. The Ministry, with the
cooperation of the World Health Organization and the Libyan-American
Joint Public Health Service, systematically introduced corrective pub-
lic health measures.
The handling of food in markets and restaurants has come under
government regulations. Daily inspection of the premises by sanita-
tion employees has become routine. The slaughter of animals for the
meat markets of the country now must meet given government standards,
as does the processing and canning of fish.v-l) As yet, there are no
government regulations requiring the pasturization of milk, but this
will come in time.
These efforts in the sanitation field are presented here to show
a few of the measures adopted by the Libyan government in an effort to
reduce the overall susceptability to disease. Other measures, such as
the draining of marshlands, a preventive measure in the war against
malaria, the chemical spraying of livestock to prevent meat infection,
and the repairing of wells in the drive for cleaner drinking water,
were all among the early steps taken by the Ministry of Health.
•* # *
^°^Hefter, Or-. cit
. ,
p. bh.
Embassy of the United Kingdom of Libya, "Highlights on Libya,"
Washington, D. C., 1958, p. h. (Mimeographed)
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MEDICAL FACILITIES
Following the institution of a sanitation program, the Ministry of
Health turned its attention to the problem of expanding and improving
existing medial facilities. Having but a few hospitals, and these loca-
ted in the major cities, the new Ministry consulted with the World Health
Organization authorities and with specialists of the American Point Four
Program (ICA). A survey conducted established the minimums under which
the new Ministry would operate. Though the greater proportion of health
funds came from these two organizations, at no time did either attempt
to direct the efforts of the ne1^ Libyan agency. Their purpose was to
advise only, and the actual direction of the new Ministry was entirely
in the hands of the Libyan government.
With independence, the Libyan government took over all former
Italian hospitals. This gave Libya the nucleus for their new medical
facilities. In all, there are only twenty-one hospitals in the coun-
try. ( 62 ) in the early days, many of these were inadequately equipped
and greatly understaffed. The first of these two problems was rela-
tively simple to correct. The world organization and friendly nations
were quick to provide the necessary equipment, tut the staffing of
these hospitals was more difficult.
As with the national educational problem, foreigners had to be
recruited to staff the new facilities. Middle-Eastern and European
doctors, notably Italian, arrived in Libya to take over the staffing
of the existing hospitals. As new hospitals are constructed, the
recruiting of additional doctors becomes an acute problem for the
^Lindsay, Op. cit .
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Ministry. As of today, the shortage of doctors in the country is indeed
acute. Where there should be a minimum of 1000 doctors for a country of
Libya’s size, there is actually only slightly more than 100. The trad-
gedy of the situation lies in the fact that while additional doctors are
available for service in Libya, the government simply cannot afford to
employ more. This problem is currently an iter on the agenda of Libyan
diplomats, for funds to permit the hiring of additional doctors can
come only from external sources.
There is even a greater shortage of nurses in the country. In
195>3j there were only sixty-four women in Libya who were trained nur-
ses, fifty-one of them in Cyrenaica, and all of these were foreigners.
'
A School of Nursing was opened two years ago to train native girls, but
it takes three years to qualify as a nurse in Libya, the first class has
yet to graduate. (6^;)
To help out during the existing shortage of nurses, there are over
li00 medical orderlies working in the nation's hospitals and dispensaries.
The bulk of these people are native Libyans and Italians, and all have
had elementary nursing training. Some of them are remarkably efficient
and dedicated, considering that they are only paid LL 2 ($5.60) per week. (65 )
To supplement the extreme shortage of hospitals, the Ministry of
Health has constructed 150 government dispensaries scattered throughout
the country. These dispensaries have an annual turnover of l| million
^ 63 ^Ibid .
^^Hefter, Op. cit
. ,
p. hh,
( 65 )Lindsay, Op. cit
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patients, and for the most part are staffed by medical orderlies. They
are visited, usually once a week, by a doctor who takes care of the more
serious cases. The United Nations has provided fifteen vehicles for the
doctors who make these rounds.
American funds contributed to the Libyan-American Joint Health Ser-
vice, have provided three "Clinicars," mobile medical clinics. Designed
to spread medical facilities over the vast desert community, this ser-
vice is aimed primarily to the under priveleged persons living in iso-
lated villages and to nomadic tribes. The four-wheel drive vehicles
enables the government to provide medical facilities in areas formerly
inaccessable. (^7
)
In addition to the American contributions already cited, American
economic assistance funds, which amounts to between eighteen and twenty
million dollars annually, underwrites a major portion of the nation’s
health budget. Considering that eighty-five million dollars has been
contributed by the United States to Libya since 195>lj., the American tax-
payer has certainly contributed greatly toward the health and welfare
of the Libyan people . ; ) While this figure may seem staggering to
some, it is actually quite small in comparison with similar American
grants extended to other nations.
A portion of the assistance funds assigned to the Ministry of
Health have been earmarked for the equipping and repairing of hospitals
in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata, Tobruk and Sebha. In addition, these
(66) ]yiew York Times
,
July 18, 1952, p. 28.
(£7) ibjd . t December 2, 1958, p. 31.
( 68
^ Ibid.,
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funds have made possible the construction and equipping of dispensaries
in all three provinces.
The financing of sanitation programs throughout the country is also
made possible through these funds. Such programs as malaria control,
typhus suppression and sewage disposal, exist primarily through the
assistance of American, British, and United Nations contributions.
ATTACKING iHB HEALTH PROBLEMS
It is when attacking the national health problems that the public
relations problems emerge. True, some public relations efforts had to
be exerted in the area of preventive medicine, i.e., in the area where
personal and community sanitation and hygiene schemes were introduced,
but the major public relations problems emerge with the recognition and
attacking of the national health problems.
For example, according to the World Health Organization survey,
the first major health problem is that of acute diarrhea. This disease,
which causes 5>000 deaths among Libyan infants yearly, is the product
of poverty and ignorance. Theorists will say that the problem can be
eliminated by simply raising the living standards of the people. They
will even concede that this is a long-range problem, but nevertheless,
while this long-range problem exists, !?000 Libyan children are dying
each year. To raise the living standards of any nation is a vast under-
taking. When the nation is labeled underdeveloped, a nation as desper-
ately poor as Libya, the problem is then greatly magnified. The raising
..
93
of a nation's living standards is composed of many facets, economic, edu-
cational, and even spiritual. It is far more difficult to accomplish
than it is to prescribe.
Before discussing the problem of acute diarrhea, the author would
like to present an account of an interview with a European doctor who
is employed by the Libyan-American Joint Health Service. This account
will point out an existing social condition in Libya which shows the
degree of poverty and ignorance that contributes to the pitifull health
standards in rural areas. It must be understood, however, that this
condition is not universal in Libya, but it does exist among certain
minority groups, like the nomadic tribes.
First of all, for a tribal woman to go to a male doctor, is in
violation of a social taboo. As previously stated, only the husband,
father, and immediate family may see the unveiled face of a grown woman.
Examining a woman's body is, therefore, out of the question. In rare
cases, where a woman doctor is available (as in Benghazi), a tribal
woman may submit to a medical examination, but even then she is likely
to be accompanied by another female member of her family.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that childbearing
among the nomads is accomplished under the most primitive conditions.
According to the doctor interviewed, it is not uncommon for an ex-
pectant mother in a nomad tribe to go off by herself in the desert as
her time draws near. She burrows a hole in the sand, and lowering her-
self into it, awaits the coming of her child in solitude. As the child
is born, the mother cuts the umbilical cord with two sharp stones, and
..
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ties it with a bit of rag taken from her heavily henna-dyed hair. She
then lies there nursing her child -until she is strong enough to walk
back to the tribal area.(^)
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that so many children
die during their first few months of life. And until such time as
Libya has sufficient women doctors and nurses, the situation is likely
to remain as critical.
It must be repeated,, however, that the above example concerns only
a minority, and should not be interpreted as being typical of the entire
nation. Certainly, the health standards in Libyan urban centers are
equal to any in the Middle East.
In attacking the prime health problem of the country, the Ministry
realized that it had a major public relations problem on its hands.
Their first efforts in rectifying the situation entailed the institution
of a nation-wide educational process. This was necessary for the chang-
ing of archaic attitudes held by many people. Health films, portraying
action taken against acute diarrhea in other countries were shown free
of charge at night in the town squares. British and American mo-
bile units (cinema vans) were used in this project, another example
of the cooperation given the Libyan government by friendly nations.
These vans enabled the Ministry of Health to expand its efforts in reach-
ing the majority of the population. The films, made in Arab countries
with Arab casts, brought the problem directly to the Libyan people, and,
along with concentrated efforts of the Ministry in the nation's press,
Interview with Dr. James Allen, Libya-American Joint Health
Service, November It, 1956.
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was successful in changing the attitudes of many people toward per-
sonal hygiene, infant diet and care. Talks by Libyan Health officials
and Arabic-speaking medical specialists usually followed the film
presentations. The radio medium was also utilized, as were government-spon-
sored editorials in the nation's newspapers. Health classes conducted
in the Libyan school system also furthered the aims of the Ministry of
Health,
It is also anticipated that when the first group of Libyan women
are graduated from nurses training, the Ministry's aim to reach all of
its people, especially its women, will be greatly enhanced. As more
and more women take an active role in health and education, the old.
social problem concerning the inferior status of women should be greatly
reduced, therebj'- accomplishing a two-fold purpose.
The public relations problems concerning the improvement of the
health problems from the external point of view, i.e., in the securing
of foreign financial and technical assistance for health projects, came
early in the nation's independence. Originally, these efforts entailed
little more than the careful wording of assistance requests to be pre-
sented to the world organization and to friendly nations. Subsequently, they
have evolved into the conducting of surveys, the measurement of effective-
ness of particular projects, and the preparation of reports, charts and
graphs to show nations contributing to Libya, where and how their money
is being spait. This is done primarily as an obligation which the
Libyan government feels it has to its benefactors, and also as an aid
for additional fund requests in the future.
* * *
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Trachoma, the second greatest health problem in Libya, requires
a major portion of the national health budget. A disease of the eyes,
trachoma has been contracted by 30 per cent of the nation's school
children, in addition to vast numbers of the adult population.
This disease, which has its origins in the lack of personal hygiene,
develops in four stages: In the first stage, slight conjunctivitis of
the anterior wall of the eye ball and lining of the eyelid occurs. This
period ususally lasts several weeks. The second stage is the inflama-
tori'- period, which permits clinical diagnosis. The eyes become red and
a mucus forms in them. This period may last from several months to
several years. The third stage is marked by the appearance of scar
tissue which leads to a cure of the disease. The final stage is that
of healed trachoma. The scar tissue remains, and if the process is
repeated over a period of time, it can lead to total blindness. '' 70 )
The cause of this disease has been frequently cited by laymen as
the lack of personal hygiene, specifically from not washing often enough.
By this description, one would believe that those who contract trachoma
have unclean habits
. This is not entirely true, and two factors which
play an important role in the spreading of trachoma should be mentioned
at this time.
First of all, it should be remembered that in desert countries,
especially in Libya, where the annual rainfall—the chief source of
life giving water—is less than nine inches per year, water is
precious, and it becomes habit-forming to restrict its use to drinking
("^Rosalie A. May, May's Manual of the Diseases of the Eyes
,
(22nd ed.
rev., Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins co
. ,
T^rirpp.
(71)
[Patrick J. Mstoney Illj, Waterspreading in Libya, (Beirut,
Lebanon: Near East Regional Service' Weh,t-er, ,'*( lfJS'JA), 1956;, p. 2.
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by humans and animals. Secondly, in the urban centers where an ample
water supply exists, the economic pressure of a .family living on ten
piasters (28 cents) a day, precludes the investment of a few piasters
for a bar of soap, (72)
These observations are not interjected by way of defense of the
situation, but they do contribute to it, and as such, should be con-
sidered before making hasty judgments about a people who are in an un-
fortunate position. The problem, therefore, exceeds personal hygiene.
Jt evolves from, and must be cured by, the economic conditions of the
country. For if the living standards are not improved, the national
health standards can never exceed the existing level. Living standards,
of course, cannot be raised until the production of the country is
greatly improved. This will take a long time.
Experience has proven that for effective trachoma control, drug
therapy must be supported by community, home and personal hygiene.
The realization of this premise produced many public relations headaches
for the Ministry of Health. For example, how does a government agency
tell a sensitive citizenry that they must keep their bodies clean? The
earlier efforts were understandably vague, but by careful wording of
editorials, posters, brochures, lectures and radio broadcasts, the
message was successfully conveyed, and with a certain degree of visible
achievement. While the exact degree of success is not known, the in-
cidence of trachoma has noticeably decreased in the past few years
(72)Lindsay, Op. cit
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(seventy-five per cent among school children during the year 1956).^)
It may be safely assumed that the public relations efforts in the anti-
trachoma campaign have met with some success.
* *
The third major health problem, tuberculosis, is currently receiv-
ing the major attention of the Libyan health authorities. The Ministry
of Health has attacked the problem with vigor. It has employed a num-
ber of tuberculosis specialists, and the most modern treatment of the
disease possible is now available in Libya,
Recently, His Excellency, King Idris, attended a cornerstone cere-
mony of a new multi-million dollar tuberculosis sanitarium. This hos-
pital, located on a high coastal plateau near the runins of the ancient
Greek city of Cyrene, will offer services equal to any tuberculosis
sanitarium in the world when completed. The presence of the Libyan
monarch at this ceremony marks the importance of the project in the
eyes of the Libyan people.
The major public relations problem in this area entailed getting
tuberculin-infected people to admit that they had the disease, and to
report to the hospital for treatment. This problem is similar to one
in our own country less than a hundred years ago. At that time, to have
tuberculosis was a family disgrace, and anyone suspected of having the
disease was kept isolated and left to die.
(73)Report to the Prime Minister, Accomplishments of the Libyan
Government Economic Development Program Made Possible By American Aid,
(Tripoli: Government Printing Office, July 1, 1957), p. 25.
(7U)Hefter, Op. cit..
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Unlike the earlier period in our own history, the disease can
be cured today, or at least arrested to permit a normal life for the
infected person. The elimination of the "incurable taboo", and the
publicizing of the modern tuberculosis sanitarium, were the major
public relations efforts in this problem.
* *
THE GENERAL HEALTH PICTURE
Only eight short years since independence, Libya has made great
strides in the fight against disease and the improvement of the na-
tional health standards.
With the aid of external financial assistance, the government has
been able to build, remodel, equip and staff modern medical facilities.
These hospitals, dispensaries (or ambulatoria, as they are known local-
ly), and mobile "Clinicars", have extended public health facilities
throughout the three provinces.
The establishment of a nurses training school has gone far to
further the cause of medical assistance to Libyan womankind. Health
programs under government supervision have been instituted in the
nation’ s school system. In addition, trachoma treatment centers are
maintained in connection with community centers, with an average in-
patient load of about J4OOO adults per month. Public Health physi-
cians supplement clinical drug therapy with eye surgery to prevent
(7%)v
'Report to the Prime Minister, Op. cit .
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permanent trachoma injury. Sanitation, nursing and public health
personnel provide direct support by intensive community group and
home activities to teach basic public health and oersonal hygiene.
The nursing staff, limited as it is, carry out extensive home visi-
tation and group instruction to expectant mothers, and to mothers of
pre-school children.
The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, the funding agency
for the Libyan-American Joint Services, has allocated LL70,000 pounds,
($1,960,000) to the Ministry of Health for the construction and equip-
ping of health training projects in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. These
projects include a Nurses Training School, a Medical Assistant School,
and several Child Health and Maternal Care Schools. These training
institutions are supervised by the Ministry of Health with the assis-
tance of the World Health Organization of the United Nations.
SUMMARY
The principal public relations problem facing Libya in the field
of Health might be described as a job of selling. The selling was di-
rected to only ’’two customers”—the Libyan people and the cooperative
foreign nations.
From the internal viewpoint, the public relations efforts were
directed to "selling” the Libyan government to its own people. They
were literally shown that the health projects and policies instituted
by the Ministry of Health were in their own interest, and more Important,
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I
.
.
101
required their help. In one respect, these efforts have been success-
ful at least what has been done to date has been successful. There
remains much to be done, hoxjever, and only through the sympathetic
cooperation of the Libyan people, will future success be measured.
Externally, the Libyan government must continue to expand its
efforts in keeping the contributing nations informed as to how their
funds are being spent. This is necessary for two reasons: (1) It
fulfills an obligation to the contributing nation which the Libyan
government justifyably feels, and (2) It paves the way for any future
requests for additional economic or technical assistance funds.
Also externally, the problem of getting foreign nations to ex-
tend educational facilities to Libyan students, especially medical
students, should be a prime target for the governmental public re-
lations staff. Their efforts to date have resulted in the sending
of seven. Libyan students abroad to attend foreign medical colleges.
(
7^)
Others have received foreign educational grants to study sanitation
and other related fields. This effort must be continued and expanded
until the day that Libya has its own medical college. There is no
greater shortage in this underdeveloped nation than doctors. As Henry
Ford II noted on the floor of the General Assembly of the United Nations,
’’Libya, at the time of her independence, had but one lawyer and NO doc-
tors among her people. (77) with such an unpretentious beginning, the
Libyan national health standards have only one way to go—up. The use
of public relations should undoubtedly hasten the ascent.
( 76 )Ibid
.
^ 77
^United Nations, General Assembly, Assistance to Libya
,
(News
Release No. I8£l, December U, 195>3) (New York), p. 1.
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CONCLUSION
When a former colonial possession emerges to full independence, the
new nation, often underdeveloped, is beset with a magnitude of problems.
These national problems are always accompanied by public relations prob-
lems, and the infant nation is usually lacking public relations minded
officials. Such was the case in Libya,
In the absence of an organized public relations program, the new
government proceeds on a hit-or-miss basis. Mistakes are made, some of
which result in increasing rather than decreasing the existing public
relations problems. Since organizational deficiencies are the rule
rather than the exception, the hit-or-miss approach must suffice dur-
ing the new nation’s formative years. Should the country be fortunate
enough to have United Nations or friendly nations support, the organi-
zational deficiency is reduced to some degree. The appointment of foreign
,,advisors n to the new government by the World Organization can greatly reduce
the margin of error in local government decisions. Again, such was the
case in Libya,
The "advisor" system can lead to a great many internal public re-
lations problems itself. The advisors may suggest or recommend, but
never dictate if the national dignity of the new country is to be re-
spected. If this concept is violated, even at the lowest level, addi-
tional public relations problems, often greater than the original, result.
The first public relations effort of any new nation should be
directed toward unifying the nationalistic feeling within the country.
Before any new nation can proceed on its course to economic and political
ctf
.
1 '
,
.
’
-
.
.
,
„
.
c. ’ , I <
' f
,
' l
.
103
stability, the entire citizenry must possess some senfolence of "oneness"
or unity. As the Libyan government discovered, patriotism most readily
lends itself to this cause.
Once the new government has the complete acceptance of its people,
the nation is ready to attack the major national problems and the ac-
companying public relations problems facing them.
If the country bears the label "underdeveloped”
,
and most new na-
tions today will bear such a label, the first public relations efforts
of the new government should be directed toward procuring external
financial support. Where the new nation enjoys a strategic position in
the geography of the "Cold War", financial assistance from major powers
is most easily procured by the granting of foreign military base rights
agreements. This is by no means the only way to procure the needed
assistance, however, in underdeveloped nations, where mineral resources
are unproven at the time of independence, the exploiting of "real estate"
is often the quickest way to gain the needed financial help.
By treaty or agreements, the novice nation has its economy bolstered
and gains the needed financial strength to attack the problems facing it.
Another method used by some african nations with success entails the
joining of a Commonwealth arrangement with a major power, however, this
arrangement is made at the sacrifice of "complete" independence. The
benefits of this approach can only be determined by the strength of the
nationalistic feeling within the country.
Hand in hand with the problem of instilling nationalism in its
people, is the problem of a national communications system. In former
colonial possessions, the existing communications system at the time
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of independence is likely to be inadequate. The existing system, while
sufficient for a colonial possession, is far from satisfactory to that
needed by a sovereign state. Entire areas are often isolated, and before
a new government can fulfill its mission, the entire nation must be
connected by ample communications
•
Aside from radio, telegraph and telecommunications, the new na-
tion must improve and expand existing surface communications. Roads,
harbors and airport facilities must be improved within "budgetary
limitations" imposed by a government that is underwritten by foreign
financial grants and loans. Understandably, such an arrangement breeds
public relations problems, problems that require careful handling and
great diplomacy.
The government also has an obligation to consider its citizenry
in carrying out projects that are in the national interest. It must
keep its people informed about these projects, and without an ample
communications network, this obligation is virtually impossible to
fulfill.
Another scourge of the underdeveloped nation concerns its educational
level. Qnerging to independence from colonial status, many new nations
have an unbelievable rate of illiteracy. When such a situation exists,
the problem of educating its citizenry is a most pressing one, a problem
which requires the new government's immediate attention.
In this area, the government usually experiences a great difficulty
in making the people want an education. Such was not the case in Libya.
Denied educational freedom for many years by their former Italian masters,
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the Lib^^an people expressed a great desire for learning immediately
following the Second World War, The interim British and French ad-
ministrations expended little effort in encouraging this desire. The
desire was present, and with independence, was manifested in the over-
enrollment of the nation’s existing schools. The greatest problem the
new government faced in the field of education was the construction of
new schools on a crash basis, and the procurement of sufficient foreign
teachers to staff them.
After eight years of independence, Libya has progressed to the
point of having a national university, and the establishment of teacher-
training schools, as well as the formation of specialized educational
institutions. The improvement of the educational level of the new
nation cannot be overemphasized, as the future of the nation depends
upon it.
In areas of the new country where tribal living is the rule, the
need for education is even more a^cute. Boarding schools for nomadic
children serve two purposes, in that they provide education for an
underprivileged minority and while the children are attending school,
the nomadic wanderings of the parents are more or less stabilized.
In new nations where the population size is considerably smaller than
the existing land size, the need for getting nomadic tribesmen to settle
in one place constitutes a major problem for the government. Stabilized
families make for a stabilized country, and only when this stabilization
is achieved can the tribal people benefit from their government’s pro-
jects.
This particular problem is directly concerned with the improvement
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of the national economy. In new nations where agriculture plays the
most important role, a larger agrarian personnel is needed, and the
large nomadic minorities constitutes a source of possible manpower.
The next problem facing the novice government is that of improv-
ing the national economy. Where the country depends upon agriculture
as its life’s blood, new projects in this field are of prime im-
portance. A hungry nation is a dissatisfied nation, and the new
government’s only hope for survival is based upon the feeding of its
citizenry.
Where the new nation is composed largely of jungle or desert, as
in Libya, the problem is even greater. The conversion of desert waste-
lands into farmland—a long-range effort—must be accomplished if the
nation is to feed its own people. While the problem entails a great
effort over many years, Libya has managed to increase its agricultural
products output in only eight years to the point where its agricultural
products today constitutes the nation’s largest export commodity.
Land reforms and the introduction of new agricultural methods,
large-scale irrigation, and water conservation have made possible the
agricultural advancement in Libya, The major public relations efforts
in this area have been directed toward gaining public acceptance of
the new methods in face of strong tribal and provincial feeling. The
success of the public relations efforts to date can be measured by the
growth of the agricultural economy of the country.
In the field of national economy, the exploitation of national re-
sources is essential. Until 19^9, agriculture has held the nation to-
gether. Recently, however, the discovery of oil in commercial quantities
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has given hope to the infant nation. With external foreign assistance
agreements running out, this discovery now holds the fate of the nation.
Should the results of oil exploration prove but one-half that of Iraq
or Saudi Arabia, Libya’s future is secure. Other mineral deposits,
such as copper, coal and bauxite could greatly enhance the future
economy of the country, and exploration for these minerals is currently
underway.
But this is in the future. Present-day problems must be met and
overcome. The problem of national health will not wait for the future.
In Libya, as in other underdeveloped nations, the general health of its
citizenry was appaling during the early days of independence. Two-thirds
of the nation suffered from endemic trachoma. The scarceness of water
demanded the limitation of its use to drinking by humans and animals.
In urban communities where water was plentiful, the existing economic
standards where a family was forced to live on 28 caits per day, pre-
cluded any investment in the ”luxury” of soap. The health problem,
therefore, is interrelated with the problem of improving the national,
economy.
Child birth and child care, especially in rural areas, is strongly
interrelated with the national educational problem, and is directly con-
cerned with the problem of national communications.
The author has, therefore, presented a series of five, major prob-
lems which confronted the new nation virtually at its birth. They do
not represent all or even a majority of the national problems facing
an infant nation, but they do constitute the areas where the greatest
difficulty may be anticipated.
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All of these problems are interrelated with each other, and their
order of importance as presented by the author are not dogmatic. Na-
tions will vary from one to another, and the order of presentation in
this thesis represents their importance as they existed in Libya. With
the exception of the first problem, that of nationalism, the remaining
problans majr vary in importance or precedence in different countries.
* * *
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APPENDIX


is is the story of waterspreading.
Libya, like her fellow North African countries, is faced with a
continual shortage of water. A parched, sun-baked land, void of any
major rivers or lakes, Libya is faced with the monumental task of
reclaiming desert wasteland in order to grow food for its people.
Aside from wells, rainfall constitutes Libya’s only other source
of this much-needed commodity. Like her neighbors, Libya is concen-
trating a great deal of time, labor and capital in an effort to solve the
problem of ha rnessing rainfall. For a country like Libya, whose annual
over-all rainfall is less than nine inches per year, the task is indeed
monumental.
But the Libyan people have accepted the challange. In a few short years advances have been
nade that are a credit to those responsible. The Libyan Government, through the Nazirates of
Agriculture and Public Works, with the help of “Point Four” in Libya, have attacked the
iroblem systematically.
Early technological surveys indicated that the heavier rainfalls in the Gebel rushed down
e mountainside, across the plains only to be wasted in the sea. Someway had to be found to
)w down this rushing water and to divert it into farmlands where it was sorely needed.
1 The solution to this problem was waterspreading.
What is waterspreading ?
The theory of waterspreading is simply the holding of water in one place long enough for it to be
absorbed into the ground. To do this, a dam is constructed across a known flood path. As the rushing water
hits this dam, it backs up and forms a pond. Excess water then runs off along curved dikes to the adjacent
area, where it is again held. A series of these dikes are so constructed to keep the water moving in an ever
increasing area away from the normal Wadi bed. In this manner, the water is slowed down enough to
enable the parched soil to absorb most of it. In well-designed systems, less than one-percent of the water
escapes to the sea.
Why is the absorption of water important ?
The absorption, or penetration of water into the soil, determines the size and quality of crops to be
grown on the land. In some countries, where clay makes up the greater part of the soil, only nine inches
of water penetration is needed to grow a crop of barley. In sandy soil, as in Libya, 30 to 36 inches of
penetration is needed to raise the same crop of barley, and to get this amount of penetration, water must
be held from eight to ten hours. Free, unchecked water runs its course in only four to five hours. Thus
we see the need for waterspreading.
Is waterspreading a recent development ?
Waterspreading is not something new. The ancient Romans who lived here in Libya, came
very near to perfecting waterspreading. Even today, ancient dams, terraces and spillways give
evidence of their prowess in this field. During Roman times, it was not uncommon for a “ head ”
of water to be split in three different directions — a truly remarkable feat. Had they possessed a
modern transit to enable them to follow the earth’s contours with their dikes, waterspreading
would have truly been perfected centuries ago.
At one time, nearly every Wadi bottom in the country was stabilized by rock dikes and
terraces. These areas received up to ten times the amount of moisture that the climate furnished,
due to runoff water. The majority of these old systems have lost their effectiveness due to time,
the ravages of weather, and the resultant soil erosion.
The way back to the fullest possible agricultural production lies in the restoration of the
terrace and spreader systems initiated by the Romans. The systems thus restored can then bear
the brunt of cereal production and could form a basis for production of forage crops. This would
take the load off of the better grazing lands and allow them to be used and managed for grazing
with a reasonable chance for improvment and stabilization. It would also allow for the planting
of perennial grazing species where they would have a chance to survive without competing for
the land with cereal production.
This does not mean, however, that work on management of range lands should wait upon
the completion of waterspreading projects. Effort is being made and progres is measurable in
each area where work has been undertaken. On every waterspreading project, land has been
set aside for production of forage crops. The planting of forage crops is done on part of the land
each season following the rains.
o. b-*
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How is a waterspreader system constructed ?
The construction of spreader systems fall into two categories : earth structures and rock struc-
tures. Earth structures have been made by both heavy machinery and hand and camel-drawn scoops,
At the present time, there
are two large earth-type systems
which were constructed with heavy
machinery—one at Wadi GauGau,
and the other at Kilometer 623,
East of Tripoli on the coastal road.
The system at Wadi GauGau
has been tested under heavy run-
off conditions. Since its construc-
tion, this system has been charged
nearly adozen times with “heads”
of water in excess of 200 acre-feet
This system drains an area of 76
square-miles in a section where
rainfall is estimated at twelve
inches annually.
Not all dikes are constructed
with heavy equipment. The aver-
age Libyan farmer does not have
access to this equipment, and the-
refore any effort in construction
must be made by utilizing his own
strength or the strength of his
camel or donkey.
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At the present time there are four hand-and-camel constructed projects at Sirte which cover
approximately 30 acres. Two of these projects have been subjected to heavy flows of water during
the past season, and have shown appreciable results. In the Nalut-Uazzen area, two small systems
have been handbuilt. Sweet clover
made a good growth under the
once-flooded system. Experience
has shown that these small sys-
tems can be built at a costof appro-
ximately $4.00 per acre of ground
covered by the waterspread.
In areas where rock is abun-
dant, such as the Beni Ulid section,
hand made dikes of rock are very
effective. A good rule to remember
when building a dike of this kind
is the larger the rocks used the
better. For every meter of height,
the dike should be three meters
wide if the wall is to be stable.
Although cement or mud is
not used in rock-constructed dikes,
the silt deposited after one or two
runoffs of water will nearly always
plug up the small gaps between
the rocks.
To date, the major effort in rock spreader dikes has been in the
Wadi Beni U I id and Wadi Targallat areas. In January 1955, the Tripo-
litanian Nazirate of Agriculture asked "Point Four” to assist in the
work in the Beni Ulid and Tarhuna sections. The workers were paid
for their labor in American gift wheat.
Layout work and over-all supervision of the project was handled
by Mr. Don Davis, Range Management Specialist, with the help of two
capable Libyan assistants.
Soon after completion, both systems were subjected to severe tests. On April 25, 1955, heavy
run-off of rainfall from the Garian area measured between 22,000 to 24,000 cubic-feet-per-second
at its peak. This run-off was computed across a cement causeway the width of the Wadi. The cross-
sectional area was measured and the velocity of the water was computed at 5 1/2 feet per second.
This peak run-off lasted for a period of 4 I /2 hours before it diminished to.2,000 cubic-feet-per-second.
Again on April 26, 27, 28 and 29, the Wadi discharged similar heads of water for a total of seven
peak heads of up to four hour duration. Specialists were present during this time and therefore able
to make fairly accurate computations.
At the end of this storm, it was found that approximately 60 per-cent of the dikes suffered no
damage at all, 30 per-cent lost a rock here and there, and 10 per-cent suffered major breaks. A close
investigation of the major breaks revealed that every break could be traced to faulty workmanship
or lack of end coreing across the channels.
After the storm, infiltration measurements were also made. Behind the dikes water was found
to penetrate the soil in excess of 36 inches. Without the dikes, no penetration was found greater
than 18 inches.
Waterspreading had again proved itself.
As soon as the Wadi dried up enough to work, farmers planted large areas of
millet (gassep). Its growth was greatly expedited by manure deposits washed down the
mountainside with the silt. This fertilizer, and the depth of penetration made possible
by the waterspreading system, was responsible for turning out one of the finest cereal
crops in the area’s history.
During the hot summer months that followed the Spring rains, the only areas ma-
turing well when finally harvested were those behind the dikes. Areas unplanted behind
the spreaders, however, grew up in a dense mat of Bermuda grass. This grass furnished
excellent grazing stock for the animals, and remained green nearly the entire summer.
What remains to be done?
Now that the people have seen the be-
nefits of waterspreading, the Libyan Go-
vernment is going all out to increase the
agricultural output by this method. Work
completed to date has merely scratched
the surface. Aerial reconnaissance and
map study of the Wadis draining from the
back slopes to the high rainfall area, indi-
cates that there are over 50,000 acres
of Wadi bottom suitable for similar treat-
ment in Tripolitania, and another 37,000
acres in Cyrenaica. These areas are rela-
tively certain of at least one flooding per
year, which would insure a cereal or fora-
ge crop ifwater could be held long enough
to permit 24 to 30 inches (61 to 80 centi-
meters) of penetration. There are aproxi-
mately 80,000 additional acres on which
run off water could be expected three
years out of five, and a still greater area
where flooding would occur three years
in ten.
Waterspreading then is another means
whereby nature can be made to do her
most in helping to create a better and
more prosperous Libya.
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Since the most important factor in the Libyan national economy is agri-
culture, the need for specialized training in this field became apparent early
in this young nation's history.
The Libyan Government, through the excellent cooperation of the Nazir-
ates of Agriculture and Education of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, selected sites
in the two provinces tor the establishment of Vocational Agricultural Training
Centers — schools of secondary curriculum with emphasis on forming. El Awelia,
a former Italian Colonization Center near Barce in Cyrenaica, and a former
Italian Children's Reformatory at Sidi Mesri in Tripolitania were set aside by
the government to house these new institutions.
In February of 1952, Mr. Ray Russell, a University of Missouri graduate
and a specialist in Agricultural Education, arrived in Libya under the auspices
of American Point Four to assume charge of the school at Sidi Mesri.
The sight which greeted Mr. Russell when he first saw his school was tar
from pleasant. Horses had been stabled in what was to be his living quarters,
solitary confinement cells remained in one of his future classrooms, and the
debris of three different armies — Italian, German and British — had collected
in the one usable building.
However, the Libyan Government, realizing the need for such a school,
spared nothing in renovating the building. Some nine months and 12,000
Libyan Pounds later the school was ready to receive its first students.
Among the original 30 students who came to Sidi Mesri from all sections
of Tripolitania on that day in November 1952, was 1 7-year-old Mohammed
Abdulsalam Qaja, of Beni Ulid.
Here is his story:
Mohammed Abdulsalam Qaja, 17,
journeyed from his uncle's home in Beni
Ulid by bus. He was tired after the
long journey and anxious to get enroll-
ed in the new school.
Mohammed was one of twelve ap-
plicants from the Beni Ulid area. All
twelve wished to be enrolled in the
new Vocational Agricultural Training
Center, but unfortunately, because of
limited space, and in fairness to boys i
applying from other parts of Tripoli-
tania, only one of the twelve could
be accepted from that area.
Basic tests were given the applicants,
all of whom had received their primary
school certificates. Personal interviews
by Mr. Russell, the school's director,
were also held. On the basis of gen-
eral aptitude and their farm back-
ground, the twelve were first narrowed
to four, then to two, and finally Moham-
med Qaja was nominated. He was
given a bus ticket and told on what
day he would be expected to arrive
at the new school.
It was a great day for Mohammed.
Afterwards he admitted that he was
reluctant to walk the ten kilometers
to the testing site at Beni Ulid, because
he thought he had little chance in the
open competition. It was a happy
young man who walked out of the
building with the nomination and bus
ticket in his hand.
Soon after arrival all boys are issued bed linens,
towels and soap, and heavy work clothes and
shoes. Mohammed receives his new issue from
Mr. Mohammed Bederi, the Libyan Supervisor
of Students.
Upon his arrival at the school, Mohammed is
greeted by the Director, Mr. Russell. Only four
other students of the original thirty were present
before Mohammed arrived.
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Upon arrival at Sidi Mesri, Mohammed was greet-
ed by Mr. Russell. With the other boys he was taken
to the clothing room where new work clothes and
heavy working shoes were issued. He was then as-
signed to a bed and cupboard to hold his personal
belongings in the school dormitory. New blankets,
bed linens and a pillow were given to each student,
and a generous supply of soap and towels were
turned over to them. Personal hygiene begins early in
the training at VATC.
After a hot shower and in new clothes, the stu-
dents were grouped together and given an orienta-
tion on how the school would operate, taught the
rules and regulations they would be expected to know
and obey, and were introduced to their teachers.
After the long trip from his home in
Beni Ulid, Mohammed enjoys a hot
shower. He knows, too, that after long
hours in the fields and classrooms, a hot
shower is something to look forward to
with pleasure.
Dorm i tory regulations require the students to keep
their sleeping areas neat at all times. Mr. Ali Shakshuki,
the School Secretary, shows Mohammed and fellow
student Mustapha Muafa, 22, of Misurata, the correct
way to dress a bed.
A big kus-kus dinner was served
as the first meal at the new
school. The rest of the day was
kept free so that the students,
no two of whom came from the
same town in Tripolitania, might
get aquainted. The next day class-
es began.
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An important step in the enrollment
procedure at VATC is the medical
examination. The original students who
came to Sidi Mesri in 1952 were
examined by the doctor upon their
arrival at the school. Today, because
of the great increase in medical facil-
ities throughout Libya, the boys are
examined in their own villages before
being allowed to come to the school.
The medical examination is very im-
portant. Without it, one boy could
unknowingly infect several of his fellow
students if he were suffering, say, from
trachoma. The examination is a strict
one, for only healthy students can cope
with the rigorous training in the class-
rooms and fields of VATC.
Medical treatment is available to
every student. The instructors are
trained in simple first aid, and should
a boy become seriously ill or injured
while attending school, the finest med-
ical attention available in Tripoli, the
Libyan Government Hospital, is offered
to him free of charge.
In addition, a Joint Service Health
Nurse conducts two sessions weekly at
the school in personal hygiene and
sanitation. This course is mandatory
for all students. The dispensing of
medicines for simple maladies and the
attending of minor cuts and bruises
are done by the nurse during her
visits to the school.
A hot kus-kus dinner brings together for the first
time four students from different parts of Tripoli-
tania. Enjoying their first meal at the school are
Mohammed, Naji Khalifa, 21, of Zuara, Nuri
Husein, 20, ofGarian, and Mohammed Sheibani,
21, of Jefren.
A complete medical examination is given to each
new student before he is permitted to begin his
training. Mohammed has his heart checked by
Dr. Alexander Dimitriades, soon after his arrival
at the school.
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The work day at Sidi Mesri is so divided that each boy spends
tour hours per day in the fields and three in the classrooms.
During his four years at VATC, each student can expect classes
in the following subjects:
Mathmatics Science
Rural Arithmetic
General Math
Geometry
Algebra
General Science
Chemistry
Biology
Physics
Social Science Language
Physical Education Arabic
Geography English
Religion Italian
History
Agriculture
General Agriculture
Livestock
Poultry
Rabbits
Dairy
Bee Keeping
Vegetable Gardening
Horticulture
Soils & Fertilizers
Irrigation
Farm Management
Farm Bookkeeping
Farm Shop
Blacksmithing
Wood Working
Metal Working
Masonry & Concrete
Leather & Rope working
Farm Machinery, Operating,
Repair and Maintenance
Mechanical Drawing
Farm Surveying
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Because of the acute shortage
of textbooks in Arabic on modern
farming subjects, it became neces-
sary to include English in the
school's curriculm. All of the boys
upon their arrival at the school
could not speak a single word of
English. Now, after a few short
years, all of them can speak
English and many could be called
bi-lingual.
As far as the students are con-
cerned, the most important factor
to induce them to learn English is
that a select few who have suc-
ceeded in mastering the rudiments
of the English language, will be
considered for scholarships in
specialized training at Agricultural
colleges in the United States.
Some of the most popular class-
room subjects at VATC are the
science courses. During the four
years stay at the school, each
student receives courses in general
science, biology, physics and
chemistry. Mohammed Qaja, who
has set his sights on becoming a
soils expert, particularly enjoys
the science courses and is rated
near the top of his class in them.
English is a required subject at VATC. Mohammed, who is
one of the top students in the class, has the intricacies of gram-
mar explained to him by Professor Abdin Tewfic Beseiso.
Hlffm
Some of the favorite classes of the students at VATC are the
science courses. Here in the biology class Mohammed views a
slide through the microscope as Professor Hasan Kitmitto ex-
a point to Milad Schmeila, 18, of Zliten.
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Since Libya has been endowed with
many fruit trees, an important cour-
se, fruit tree pruning, was added to
the school’s curriculum. Mohammed
learns this new skill under the gui-
dance of Mr. Mohammed Djani,
the school’s Field Supervisor, as fel-
low student, Omar Azzabi, of Giado
looks on.
In
One of the most practical courses
at VATC is blacksmithing. The stu- jjC
dents have learned to make all the m
tools necessary in farming including jC]
the plow. Four hours a week are set k
aside to learn this trade. Moham-
med learned this skill from Mr.
Mohammed Lajeili, the metalsmith y
instructor.
(Jj,
stressedare
of farm training
To cope with Libya’s arid land, the
students are taught the theory and
practice of irrigation. Mr. Russell,
the school’s director, shows Moham-
med and fellow student, Ali Jareed,
of Suk el Guimma, how to transfer
water from the main canal into the
individual garden plots.
Another phase of the horticulture
course is tree spraying. Many insects,
including the dreaded locust which
preys on the young trees, makes insec-
ticide spraying an important course
at the school. Mohammed is taught
spraying techniques by Mr. Moham-
med Djani, the Field Supervisor, as
fellow student, Omar Azzabi, of
Giado, operates the pump.
Sid i Mesri !at
IFrequent consultations with
members of the faculty enables
the students to get an accurate
account of their progress. A
report on his week’s progress
is given to Mohammed by
Professor Yusef Hazima, the
school’s Assistant Director.
A healthy teacher-student relationship is necessary at any institution
of learning. At VATC this is accomplished by means of student counseling.
Once a week each student is called before a member of the faculty to
discuss his progress or personal problems. This frank discussion between
student and instructor makes the student realize that the instructors are
interested in him as an individual, and as a result the boy is encouraged
to improve or to maintain a high scholastic rating. It has been proven at
VATC that a little reassurance goes a long way in building up a student's
self-confidence.
r
10
Spiritual training has not been neglected. A section of the students'
dining hall has been set aside as a mosque in which the boys may pray.
Classes in the Koran are also conducted, with each boy getting the
opportunity to read from it. In good weather, these classes are usually
held out of doors, and are an important part of the student's life at VATC.
A boy’s spiritual training is important at VATC. In good weather the boys group together out of
doors to hear and read from the Koran. Reading from the Koran is usually begun by the
Supervisor of Students, Mr. Mohammed Bederi. Each student then takes part in the reading.
Recreation plays a definite role in the
everyday lives of the students. An alert
mind on the playing field stimulates an
alert mind in the classroom. The boys at
VATC are ardent football fans — they are
even building their own football field.
Other sports played include volleyball,
basketball, table tennis, and even the fa-
vorite American sport of baseball has been
introduced by Mr. Russell.
A radio and phonograph have been
provided for the boys after-study entertain-
ment. Recently, the American Cultural Cen-
ter in Tripoli presented the school with a
large television receiver. The American
programs are well received by the students,
all of whom are now speaking English. A
special Arabic-language program keeps the
students abreast of current events by means
of a World News telecast every Friday. Athletics play an important role at
VATC. During a volleyball game
Mohammed leaps high in the air
for the ball as fellow students,
RamadanHammali, 21 ,ofTarhuna,
and Mohammed Girassi, 19, of
Zavia, prepare to return it.
Popular after-study entertainment
at the school is television. Moham-
med and fellow students, Mansur
Sughayyer, 22, of Azizia, and
Mohammed Feitoori 21, of Zavia,
watch Mr. Daud Kleibo, Tripoli’s
(
TV news commentator, over the
weekly Arabic-language program.
il
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Every student, especially on studying
away from home, finds himself in need of
spending money. At VATC no stipends are
paid to the students. Instead, each student
is given a plot of land and loaned seed,
fertilizer and the necessary tools to work
the soil. As crops mature, each student
harvests his own, washes it and turns it
over to the field supervisor who tabulates
the size of the crop and credits it to the
student's account. When the produce is sold
in Tripoli or at the big American Air Base
at Wheelus Field, the proceeds are re-
turned to the school.
After deductions are made to cover the
cost of the seed and fertilizer, the balance
of the profits are then turned over to the
individual student. In this manner, the boys
learn self-reliance and the value of money.
For all the boys realize that if they want
to have spending money, they must first
earn it. Neither the Libyan Government
nor Point Four pays these boys to attend
school.
|pP%,V
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When preparing to go into Tripoli, on his day off, an important
stop for Mohammed is the School Office where he will collect
his crop money. There is a sense of pride for all the boys in
knowing that the money they receive from Mr. Ali Shakouki,
the School Secretary, is not a gift — they have earned this
money, and can spend or save it as they choose.
The students always look forward to a day in Tripoli. Some
have relatives there, while others attend the cinema or athletic
events that the city has to offer. Mohammed and fellow student,
Mohammed Quallali, 22, of Nalut, wave goodbye to Professor
Yusef Hazima, after checking out for Tripoli.
Following a busy school week,
the students look forward to Thurs-
day. Thursday afternoon and Fri-
day are holidays at VATC. If the
boys have crop money coming to
them, they line up at the office
of the school secretary to receive
it after the noon meal on Thursday.
Then, off to Tripoli.
If a student has relatives living
in or near Tripoli, special permis-
sion may be granted allowing the
student to stay with them on Thurs-
day night. Otherwise they must
return to the school on Thursday
night, but may return to Tripoli
on Friday if they so desire.
For those who remain at school
over fhe holidays there are sports,
extra studying if required, or any-
thing they wish to do to keep
them busy. There is no work on
these days.
A recent addition to the school's curriculum is a course on the operation, care and
maintenance of farm machinery. The course, held in conjunction with the Natural Resources
Division of Point Four, gives the VATC students an opportunity to learn about farm
mechanization which will eventually be practiced in Libya.
The course, under the instruction of Point Four technicians, is held for the benefit of
Joint Service employees who will operate the equipment as well as the VATC students.
Like the other students, Mohammed has been taught to drive a tractor and
to operate certain types of farm equipment. Maintenance gets special
attention in this course, for the boys realize that if machinery is to operate
successfully careful maintenance is necessary.
As his four years at VATC draws to a close, plans for Mohammed's future are being
considered by the Nazir of Education and the Chief Educationist of Point Four. Because of
his excellent scholastic and field work record, there is a strong possibility that he may be
offered a scholarship to an institution of higher learning abroad — a just reward for such
an industrious boy.
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Eqkcatior^ and Agriculture
.. two ingredients for
a Prosperous Libya
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